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SEMIOLOGICAL GRAMMAR

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Dedicated to Prof. Stepanov Yu.S.

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Introduction

The main subject of Prof. Stepanov's book "Names. Predicates. Sentences" concerns the outlined terms, although the most linguists have already got accustomed that the main objects in linguistic theories are semantics and syntax. The semiological path is in this sense predetermined as semiology itself consisted of three parts – semantics, syntactics, and pragmatics. But in Prof. Stepanov's book, a new crossing point is offering – "sentence-statement" or proposition-oriented statement.

The sentence-statement is oppositive to the functioning of language; it is rather a "sentence", than a "statement". The sentence – in the form of a structural diagram or propositional function – is thus a main and initial object; first of all, semantics of language is embodied in it. But outside the sentence, there is another sphere – the Dictionary where semantics is also represented. This sphere – semantics of the dictionary – should be considered as autonomous one which reflects objective reality fixed in words and units. In semiological grammar, the systematization of sentences or syntax taxonomy is established; and semantic entities of the Dictionary depend upon it. Names are subdivided into functional classes – "individual names", "general names", etc. and into semantic classes – more independent of syntax – "Thing", "Plants", "Animals", "People".

In the sphere of semantics and syntax, the universal regularities submitting only to laws of evolution constantly dominate. In the dictionary of any language, there are groups of words corresponding to subjects and those of corresponding to syntax of predicates. This compliance universally belongs to Language in general. But whether it will be subordinated to opposition in "active" and "inactive" syntax or "subject" and "object" depends on language type – the "active" one like many languages of North American Indians or the "nominative" one like Russian, English and other IE languages. Besides of it, any lexicon of languages is various. So, a universal concept *market* goes back in Russian and other Slavic languages to the German "circle", "round area"; in the English "market" leads to the Latin word "mercatus" which, in turn, is connected in Latin with the verb *mercari* "buy", etc.

In linguistics of the last years, a dangerous duality appeared. Semantics is described now in terms of a sentence and through its prism – in such terms as "individual names", "general names", "metanames", "subjects" and "predicates", "quantifiers" and "denials", etc. Meanwhile, the form and all the tools are still described only in terms of morphology, such as "paradigms", "morphological classes", etc.

According to the all mentioned above, semantico-syntactical system of language is considered in semiological grammar as static. "Static" in opposition to "dynamic" is sometimes elucidated as something fixed, metaphysical while "dynamic" is almost a synonym of the words "progress", "development". For such understanding of "static", there are no scientific grounds. The semantico-syntactical organization of language is represented in semiology as static system because language is a sign

system; and any system is rather stable. One does not have to mix language as a sign system and language as "systems of signs", peculiar, for example, to structuralism and its approach to taxonomy. In that case, language is formed as a set of separate signs, though rather difficult organized.

Proceeding from a statement as a center, the researcher by means of "the shuttle procedure" makes operations of abstraction from syntax to semantics, from semantics to syntax until he/she – in the course of the extending abstraction – establishes, at least hypothetically, all links within semantics and syntax.

At this stage, it is possible to show more definitely the difference of semiological grammar from generative one. The last includes the dictionary and rules, and sentences are generated as a result of cumulative application of substitutions of words from the dictionary and rules. For example, let to have the rule: "S → T + N + V + T + N" and classes of words which this rule embraces in the dictionary:

T = (the)

N = {man, dog, chimpanzee...}

V ={bites, eats, opens...}

The grammatical rule symbolized by an arrow means the instruction to replace, or "to rewrite", the element which is to the left of the arrow, by an element or the sequence of the elements which are to the right of the arrow. The rule of substitution symbolized by an equal-sign means the instruction: "Replace X where X is a variable with a value of all grammatical classes mentioned in generative system (for example, T or N) by *x* where *x* is any member of a class *x*". Consecutive application of the instruction will turn T + N + V + T + N into some type of a sentence "The dog bites the man".

Thus in generative grammar, semantics is included into dictionary and rules, and the result of application of grammar – a sentence – is a simple result, lying beyond of it. The sentence in generative grammar, of course, is not necessary out of semantics, but its "attitude" towards semantics is something other.

It is quite widespread that analogy between a semantic structure of a name and a sentence could consist only in "the principle of a name", i.e. only if we agree that the sentence calls something like a name. But the majority of modern semanticians – and it is quite fair – does not recognize the ability of the sentence to call the same way as it makes a name. However from the denial of "the principle of a name" in relation to the sentence, there is no need to deny other similarities between a semantic structure of a name and a sentence.

In a word, the external element – the sequence of sounds or graphic signs, the meaning – is connected with two other elements: on the one hand, with a real subject, i.e. with a thing, phenomenon, process called "denotatum", extensional; on the other hand, with the concept or idea of this subject called (in various theories differently) "significatum", the concept, intensional. The same can be said about a statement.

Stoics found by a statement two subjects: the first, a thing or fact of the real world, on their terminology "body", and the second, a specific cogitative essence not as a combination of abstract concepts, substances and attributes, but something

unified and much richer, the mergence of concepts, representations and emotions of a person. Stoics called this essence *lekton*. Lekton is a special form of knowledge, more general, than a statement or denial.

This circumstance emphasizes that intensional, the sense of a sentence, is also something more general, than truth or falsehood. The essence of intensional can be explained on the example of two compound sentences: “It is true that (there live polar bears in the Arctic)”; “It is false that (there live polar bears in the Arctic)”. The part in brackets is an intensional, or sense, whereas the whole statement is truth or falsehood. Thus, the sense of the sentence lies in intensional area while “truth/falsehood” belongs to extensional area. In other words, the truth or falsehood is not a problem of sense, but of value of the sentence.

Semantics splits up to two spheres: subjective, or denotative, extensional, and conceptual, significative, intensional. Both spheres of semantics are quite symmetric. In some cases, it is shown sharply: the name taxonomy of the gender-specific relations of concepts finds its reflection between individuals in the nature; various grammars within one language correspond to the distinction of the subject spheres of the objective world developed by a person during the history, etc.

However, the full overlapping between spheres of semantics is absent, and a number of key problems receives its solution only in relation to each sphere separately. So, the subject or denotative synonymity (extensional identity of expressions) involves a significative or conceptual synonymity, intensional identity and vice versa. There are two types of transformations of language expressions which are parallel, but not identical – transformations in the extensional area and periphrases in the intensional area. Voice changes in grammar can be examples of transformations: “Workers build a house” – “The House is built by workers”. The first sentence is focused on workers as on an objective denotatum; the second – on the house, but the meanings of both sentences are identical. By transformations in general, the sense of the sentence remains, but there can be shifts concerning denotatum. An example of the periphrasis is “Ivan bought a goat by Pyotr” – “Pyotr sold a goat to Ivan”. By rephrasing, denotatum does not change; the sense changes.

Thus, the method of semiological grammar is mutual replacements. It is possible to call these replacements and transformations “an abstraction method”. For example, few linguists consider that the phoneme really exists in the form of a set or a class of sounds. Most of them are convinced that it is something bigger, than simply “a class”. Then a general question arises: “If there are classes of the language phenomena, then how they exist?” If, for example, there are different forms of additions – “different cases”, then in what sense there is “accusative case” in general? Even more, this question arises in relation to the category “an individual name” and to other categories of such type. It is obvious that these issues cannot already be resolved without deciding at the same time how we establish these categories.

The main method of semiological grammar represents a class in various sign substitutions by introduction and exclusion of abstractions. Such categories as “essence”, “property”, “relation”; “accusative case”, “future time”, “plural”, “case”, “time”, “number” lead to the question of existence of these categories at all: “Is there

“a case” in general?” Or “Are the terms “object”, “direct object” applicable to the languages with ergative system?”

If the problem of abstraction comes down in grammar only to classifications, i.e. to taxonomical problems, then it would be the most important part of a method. But semiological grammar is not limited to classifications. This grammar deals with constant transition from taxonomical classifications to other entities – statements. And it puts a problem of introduction and exclusion of abstractions also in other view.

Semiology in general and linguistics in particular grew from logic. Aristotle’s doctrine in large part is a logico-linguistic concept. The same can be said about logic of Stoics or the Indian logic Nyaya. At the content level, the objective semiological principle is realized in the form of various transformations, the metamorphism of functions (nomination, predication and location). For this reason, describing the content level of any language on the basis of the semiological principle entails a detailed consideration of how the basic functions are represented in this language and stages of their transformations represented.

The development and ramification of primary formal apparatuses of functions take place in a way largely analogous to that we can observe in the development of simple linguistic signs. Thus for the systematic description of this phenomenon we have to rely on a particular theory of the linguistic sign, according to which the meaning of a word is to be taken as its connection with the object referred to, or denotatum, which we shall call the “denotatum meaning”, and as its connection with a concept, or significatum, which we shall call the “significatum meaning”. In accordance with this theory, we can schematize the meaning of a word as a triangle (Frege’s triangle), which one apex represents the “phonetic word”, another the “concept”, or, in linguistic terminology, the “significatum meaning”, and the third the “object”, or the “meaning by relation to some object”, the “denotatum meaning”.

The theory of meaning based on these premises supports a view of the variations of the linguistic sign at the content level. In accordance with this theory, we expect, and in fact find, two types of variation: variations of denotatum meaning and variations of significatum meaning. The second type of variation is the variation of the significatum. We include here all those cases where the phonetic word and the denotatum remain unchanged while the significatum develops from a graphic and sensory idea to a more complex concept.

Following Mr Stepanov’s ideas, “there can be no doubt that over the past several years linguistics has been especially occupied with questions of syntax and semantics. Today it has become clear that a language may have a simple or a complex verb morphology, ramified system of declensions or no declensions at all, a well or poorly developed morphology, and so on, but no existing language is without a fully developed semantics or syntax. Oriental and occidental languages, “civilized” and “primitive”, whether possessing sophisticated literatures or no alphabet – all have fully developed semantic and syntactic systems. Today the general, universal laws of language are being uncovered in syntax, in semantics, and in the general features which unite the two in their deepest content and their most superficial expression”.

CHAPTER I

RECONSTRUCTION OF SEMIOLOGICAL GRAMMAR

1.1. Generic Names

Since generic names constitute a special problem, it is advisable to start not with the names of groups, but with "subordinate" words – the names of objects belonging to these groups or individual names.

The term "individual" means an object, which – if considered in this system – is not a set. An individual name is a noun naming such an object. The approach from the subject of designation, from denotation – the path that we are now going on – suggests that the features of the object are determined first; then everything else that concerns the semantics of the word designating it. It must be borne in mind, however, that in semantics the definition of an object always occurs within the framework of a certain system; and in it, whatever it may be, an individual is an object of the lowest type, which is not a set.

In the theoretical understanding of such an object, we are faced with a number of problems. If we define it in the hierarchy of "genera and species", between which there are continuous relations of incorporating lower levels into higher ones by introducing various attributes of definitions, then the lowest object – individual – falls out of this continuity; between it and the closest species there is a gap, an interruption in the sequence. The fact is that the species is separated from the nearest genus by one trait, or, in any case, by a finite number of characters, while the individual is separated from the lowest kind by a potentially infinite number of characters. By a finite number of characters, the individual is indefinable. Therefore, many researchers believe that the object of the lowest type in the hierarchy of genera and species is not an individual, but also a species, albeit a "species infima". Mr Leibniz, on the contrary, believed that – with the exception of the potential infinity of analysis – the individual does not differ from the species, that "every individual is the lowest species" (omne individuum est species infima). In view of this discussion, Curry's definition turns out to be quite satisfactory, which states that the individual is an object, which is not a set. From a linguistic point of view, the problem, as we try to show below, is that the natural language has several systems in its dictionary, in each of which the ratio of the individual and the set is resolved differently.

In typological terms, the problem of individuality of names and the problem of nominal classifications in the languages of the world are closely related. For us, the approach to this general solution is associated with the discovery of a language that has an almost perfect ranking of names by degree of individuality and, at the same time, with consistent substantive classification. So, the lexico-semantic system of the Spanish language, described from the point of view of gender category, appears as a

combination of several lexico-semantic categories (classes) of words. All categories are organized around one and the same elementary significant opposition, but with a special ratio of marked/unmarked members in each group and with a special additional semantic load of the main elementary opposition. The lexico-semantic classes of the Spanish language, organized around the gender category, are systematized in the following classification. Nouns: 1) Inanimate (things, action names, abstract names) – Animate; 2) Inanimate (plants) – Animate; 3) Non-Humans (animals) – Humans; 4) Non-Professions (kinship, proper names, surnames) – Professions (specialty, occupation).

The noted originality of the Spanish language – the continuity of the nominal classification – is explained by the special structure of the category of the genus in this language. The fact is that in the genetic predecessor of the Spanish language – Latin – at a certain, relatively late stage of its history the suffix of generic classes of nouns inherited from the IE state began to degrade; the suffix differences between them were smoothed out, and the last was replaced by an indicator of gender. In the Late Latin, the gender of the noun was revealed not so much by the morphological indicator – the suffix of the noun – but by the end of the adjective connected with the noun. In general cases, any name with which the adjective ending in *-um* was consistent (in Spanish *-o*) was the name of masculine gender, every noun with which the adjective ending in *-a* (in Spanish *-a*) was consistent was the name of feminine gender (middle gender has disappeared). This tendency existed in all Romance languages.

Ultimately, in Spanish the difference in the indicators *-o/-a* also began to determine the difference in the gender of the nouns, and a huge number of paired nouns developed, like adjectives, for example: *hermano/hermana; maestro/maestra; obrero/obrera*. In other languages, in such cases, as a rule, there is a difference in the stems (cf. Rus. *brother/sister*) or a complete difference in suffixes. This circumstance provided taxonomic continuity in the vocabulary of the Spanish language, which allows us to represent the latter in a dichotomous classification. The natural taxonomy of the Spanish language, presented in the form of a dichotomy, is fully consistent with the classification of substances, or entities, of Aristotle, as presented in the “Porphyry tree”.

For linguistic purposes, however, the “Porphyry tree” must be modified. Modification consists primarily in the elimination of intermediate names between cycles – “body”, “living”, “animal”. The fact is that, if the names contained in the headings of the circles are the names of the analyzed language, then the names of the cycles in the “Porphyry tree” are the names of metalanguage. The difference between the two is in itself a very complex problem that we do not consider here; it is only clear that the number of metanames in the classification must be as small as possible; names between circles are superfluous. However, it is impossible to eliminate the metanames completely; in particular, they remain in the headings of circles. Moreover, the metanames of the headings with odd numbers are “inanimate”, “without gender” – the grammatical nomenclature common in linguistics.

The modified “Porphyry tree” is a taxonomy of natural language nouns – their semiological classification. It possesses at least the following four remarkable features: 1) being a classification of names, it reflects at the same time the natural classification of objects – “Things”, “Plants”, “Animals”, “People”. The classification emphasizes that “names are the consequence of things” (Nomina sunt consequentia rerum); 2) it is built according to the subsumption principle; moreover, each heading having an even number allows to continue this division according to the same dichotomous principle, and this is at the same time the division of the genus species, while each heading with an odd number is in a sense a dead end and does not allow to continue the division on the same grounds. The smaller the odd number, the stronger is the negative property of the rubric. The column “Things” is already being dropped out of the classification at the second stage, and it should be expected that it differs sharply in terms of the indicated principles of division from subsequent groups; 3) since all the rubrics following the “Things” obey the subsumption principle and at the same time are the groups of the “Live” category, it is possible to formulate a situation common for language semantics: the subsumption principle of classification is an abstraction of relations of the genus and species in wildlife. This makes it clear why “Things”, as a rule, are not amenable to genus-species classification; 4) the rubrics of the given classification are precisely those different “systems”, the possibilities of which we have mentioned above and in which the relation of the individual and the set is solved in completely different ways.

In general terms: the greater the sequence number of the group is, the greater must be the degree of individuality it defines (and requires) in the language for the names included in it. Returning to the third property, the same situation can be expressed differently: the concept of an individual in the taxonomy of a language is an abstraction of the category of “individuals” in living nature and varies depending on the types of the latter; an individual in the plant world differs in the degree and quality of individuality from an individual in the animal world.

1.1.1. Things

First of all, it must be said that the names of things are usually excluded from the process of linguistic individualization: words such as ‘chisel’, ‘hammer’, ‘cabinet’, ‘table’, ‘chair’, ‘coat’, ‘kitchen’, ‘cottage’, etc., are both the names of the class and the names of the individuals of this class. Only in exceptional cases, they are individualized. Moreover, individualization occurs most often through personification, that is, on the grounds of a different rubric – “Man”; and it is performed according to special rules. Briefly, they can be either an object likened to a gender and then gets its own name, similar to the name of a person, or it is individualized. By the British, the nation of seafarers, ship as an exception to other names of objects is a noun of feminine gender, a ship is “she,” while all other objects are “it”.

A great deal of material is provided by observations over experiments on the systematization of vocabulary in ideographic thesaurus. It turns out that the dichotomous partitioning according to the principle of the "Porphyry tree" is feasible on the whole set of words included in such a dictionary. A group of words that can be considered the names of "Things" in the proper sense of the word, that is, material objects created by a person or directly related to a person are the names of various tools, buildings, professions, social positions, social events, objects etc., which cannot be ordered by the genus-species principle. Such words form special, denotational groups and require internal ordering in the group on other grounds: according to the relations of the part and the whole, practical purpose, material basis, manufacturing method, method of application, ways of influencing the human body, etc.

1.1.2. Water, Fire, Wind

If, as it is reasonably assumed, PIE was an active language (here the stage preceding the Uhlenbeck stage is meant), then it must have had the binary distinction of active and inactive nouns. Some scholars apply this regularity without modification to such nouns as "wafer", "fire" among others. Each of the respective entities is then supposed to have been denoted by at least two nominates, one presenting it as an active vital force, especially deity, the other treating it as an inactive object. Words like "water", "fire" and so on, as well as all other names of things, belonged initially to the inactive class. The active doublets or possibly any doublets in general represent historically secondary formations – being extractions from the respective predicates.

The observation with which we start here is that all IE languages introduce natural force denominations and names of "human activities" into word combinations based on the principles of *figura etymologica* or *paronomasia.* Some of these nouns are deletable and recoverable impersonal subjects (they are presented further in group A). Others are objects neutralizing the accusative and the nominative forms (group B). The subjects involve both "active" forms (bearing the PIE suffix **-tejor*) and "passive" forms (with the PIE suffix **-t(o)*). Still other sequences (group C) consist of a verb and its object, the latter being as deletable and recoverable as the subjects in group A. It is the group C into which we include some sequences with the semanteme "fire": "to strike the fire"; "to blow the fire"; "to light, to make up the fire" – all of them being tautological.

1.1.3. Plants

Plants, mushrooms, fruits, vegetables are usually identified as to species. The name of the species simultaneously serves as an individual name. However, the names of plants can receive individual names as the name of a class.

The absence and even the impossibility of individualization corresponds to the objective features of plant taxonomy. The founder of taxonomy Mr Linnaeus described species as homogeneous units. However, it was soon established that large species – the so-called “linneones” – split into many varieties, differing in dozens of characters associated with leaves, flowers, grains, etc. The botanists began to divide linneones into small species in accordance with such features. They were called elementary species, or “jordanones”, by the name of the French botanist A. Jordan, who, studying weed croup (the cruciferous family), divided this species into more than 200 hereditary forms, giving each a name. But very soon it was understood that the process of isolating “jordanones” was almost endless.

The definition of a class in this area seems to be problematic. In fact, if we cannot linguistically define an individual, then how do we define a class? And what from a linguistic point of view is a class here?

Based on the concept of semantic indeterminacy in Leibnizian sense, Mrs Wierzbicka described extensive fragments of vocabulary universally represented in different languages. Vocabulary can be divided into two different groups depending on whether the word can or cannot be explained, directly or indirectly, in terms of 15 or so undetectable semantic entities. Among words that can be explained are the names of body parts, natural objects – ‘sea’, ‘river’, ‘field’, ‘forest’, ‘cloud’, ‘mountain’, ‘wind’, etc., product names – ‘table’, ‘house’, ‘book’, ‘paper’, etc., as well as the generic names of living creatures – ‘bird’, ‘fish’, ‘insect’, ‘plant’, ‘animal’, etc. Words that cannot be explained are also words denoting “species” (in the broadest sense of the term): ‘cat’, ‘rose’, ‘apple’, ‘birch’, ‘gold’, ‘salt’, etc.

The concept of “class” in this sense usually coincides with the concept of “species”. The same is true for most names of domestic animals. But the logical definition of the meanings of such names in the framework of the language system is always incomplete. This is but consistent with common practice within explanatory dictionaries, cf.: “Sandpiper is a small marsh bird with long legs”. A complete definition of the meaning of such words requires not dictionary definitions, but encyclopedic information. Mrs Wierzbicka rightly believes that such words as “cat”, “rose”, “apple”, etc., in their semantic structure are similar to proper names such as Ivan, John, London. Just as John essentially means only “a person whose name is John”, the word “cat” also means only “the animal, which in this language is called “a cat”. Therefore, the translation of such words in bilingual dictionaries has a following form: “Rus. *cat* is “an animal, which in Russian is called *a cat* corresponds to Engl. *cat* – “an animal that is called *a cat* in English”. On the contrary, the translation of words under the heading “Things” such as “chisel”, “screwdriver” can be given on the basis of a common semantic definition, since it has an obvious identity of reference.

1.1.4. Animals

Many animals, especially non-domestic ones, are individualized with the same degree as plants, and linguistic problems that arise in this case are the same. Here, however, the degree of similarity to a human being plays a bigger role. Small non-warm-blooded animals occupy the far pole on this scale. They usually fall out of the classification by gender, because an ordinary person, not a specialist, is unable to catch their gender differences. If it is necessary to individualize them for any purposes, they primarily resort to gender discrimination by adding the appropriate qualifier words: male snake, female mosquito, etc. In Spanish, which differs in a generic classification, similar characteristics in speech are easily used to individualize people named by the common name of the profession, for example: *asistente-hembra, asistente-macho*. Pets, especially large ones, are individualized by means of nicknames similar to people's names. At the same time, dogs are more individualized than cats, cats more than goats, goats more than hens, hens more than pigeons, etc. Under certain conditions, in some languages, the name of the whole group may also be an individual name; so in French *la bete* "my cat" or "my dog", "my animal".

1.1.5. People

A person, of course, is individualized to the maximum extent, and this fact poses a special linguistic problem. As we have seen in the previous section of taxonomy, the individual name is primarily developed in the semantic realm "Person". The question, therefore, is: does the language system have any sufficiently typified, permanent ways to distinguish individuals under the general heading "Person"? Researchers answered it differently. If we use the semantic triangle scheme, then we can say that there are opportunities for three different approaches, and all of them have actually been used in research practice.

1. The approach from the subject of designation, from denotation, first involves a description of the subject within the framework of a certain system, which itself must be taxonomic. From this point of view (although in fact it was not always formulated at the same time), several solutions were proposed, of which we will mention four, more important.

The ancients answered the question posed above, apparently negatively. "Thus," wrote Porphyry, "as the substance stood at the very top because before it was nothing, it was a genus of the highest degree; analogically a person is a species over which there is no other species or anything else to be divided into species. If we consider that under the heading "Person" there are already only proper names, then this is similar to such a solution as that of Porphyry.

However, observations over taxonomy of names in natural language lead to a second answer. The Spanish language, which has a natural and formally expressed taxonomy of names, hides directly under the name "Person" not only people's names, but also names of professions organized on the same basis. In this language,

hermano/hermana, maestro/maestra, filologo/filologa, gallinero/gallinera, lechero/ lechera, etc. are symmetrically opposed like proper names *Claudio/Claudia, Emilio/Emilia, Nicolas/Nicolasa, Pablo/Pabla*.

The solution, inspired by the Spanish language, seems to be quite general, and the differences between the languages in this regard are not in essence, but only in the degree of consistency of the same decision. Let us compare the names of persons and at the same time objects of human activity in the Russian language: *raskleivatel', kroshitel'* etc. In modern IE languages, such designations differ by suffix indicators, which previously express the opposition in terms of functional characteristics, for example, male professions are opposed to female professions. In general, the main partitions of these groups correspond to the basic suffix classes, and they bear primarily functional characteristics.

The next solution is proposed by Mrs Wierzbicka. According to the Polish researcher, the name "man" hides two different semantic entities. One of them can be described as a "human body", and the other can simply be contrasted with the first, that is, defined negatively, as "something in a person that is not only his body". However, it cannot be reduced to "spirit" alone; the second semantic essence is "the human body and spirit" at the same time. The difference between the two entities is revealed by substitutions. So, the sentence *Adam is lying on the bed* is identically to "The body of Adam is lying on the bed". On the contrary, the sentence *Adam received a diploma* cannot be described as "The body of Adam received a diploma". In the second case, we see, therefore, another semantic entity, hiding under the name of man, Adam, etc.

The last solution is to divide semantic entities under the name "man" into two classes, or "species". The first of them is "I", the indicator of the speaker's gender, the second – everything else. In fact, only a part of predicates can be assigned to "I": so-called performative verbs 'swear', 'promise', 'undertake', etc. They are an act of oath, promise, obligation, etc. only when pronounced on behalf of "I" . Expressions in the 3rd person of the type "He swears" mean something different: "He says something, and what he says sounds like an oath".

Some predicates cannot be – in their basic, non-figurative meaning – attributed to the person "I". These are the verbs 'melt', 'pour', 'flow', 'crack', 'burst', 'peel', 'break', etc. There are languages such as Lithuanian where similar verbs are distinguished by a special morphological form of conjugation.

Proper names should be considered as a special case of individual names. Proper names carry two combined functions: they denote, firstly, individuals, and secondly, individuals who are still not similar to any other individuals, i.e., do not belong to sets. The term "individual" itself used in some works and dictionaries is ambiguous: it means either "individual" or "single". The term "individual" is defined above. As for the term "single," it means "referring to an individual who is not like any other individuals, one of a kind (class, plural)". In this meaning, it corresponds to the English term singular.

Of course, an object called a proper name, a single name, a singular term may be included in any sets or classes, may be similar to other objects, but this will be similar

in another way and form, in which this object will be included in a different way rather than the one in which it is taken by its own name. The term “single”, in addition, is used to denote judgments of a certain type and, finally, is connected by deep philosophical associations, being a member of the series “single” – “special” – “universal”.

Thus, the main term remains the “individual name”. Considering individual names, we will also cover the rest.

2. The approach to individual names from the concept of the subject of designation. The difficulties that arise here can be very great. When the semantician speaks of terms of denotations, he/she can easily express the individual’s attitude to the class, saying that the individual belongs to this class. For example, the individual “author of Waverley” belongs to the class “Person”. When the semantician applies the plan of significations, it is very difficult to express a parallel relationship between the concepts. One could put it this way: “The individual concept of the author of Waverley is brought under the property “Person”.

But the individual concept itself is a certain property or some set of properties (moreover, as already noted, due to the unavoidable unnaturalness of individual definitions – a set, usually very small or even reduced to one property). Thus, it is necessary to perform a rather unnatural operation of bringing one property under another.

Regarding this difficulty, Mr Carnap writes: “Since it is unusual to talk about individual concepts, there is no word in ordinary usage to denote the relationship between an individual concept and a property, between an individual and a class; for this relationship we have to use the word “subsumption”.

3. The approach to individual names from the third element of the sign – the name and its syntactic behavior. It begins with an analysis of the distributional characteristics of individuals and proper names and ends with the problem “Search for a referent”.

Proper names do not know restrictions on semantic compatibility in a sentence. The maximum paradigmatic independence of the proper name corresponds to this syntactic property of almost unlimited semantic compatibility; it is not included in the semantic categories of a dictionary and is devoid of constant reference.

However, the indicated freedom of a proper name, both in syntactic and in dictionary terms, cannot be understood as absolute; it is still limited, although to a very weak degree. Mr Searle showed that proper names establish a reference, albeit in a somewhat vague way. Proper names are not descriptions, but they are “pegs on which descriptions are hung”.

Proper names do not allow further individualization by adding “this”, “that”, etc. If such boosters are used, it only means that the proper name is not enough individual in a given situation or context.

In English, the “restrictive adjunction” of a noun is a combination with an article like “the boy” or a combination like “who, that...”. Any noun used so is an individual name in this context. If such a phrase is absent, but can be obtained by transformation, then this is a sign that the text contains an individual name in the

appropriate place. On this basis Mr Vendler proposed semantic periphrases to identify individual uses of names (singular terms) in English:

The mouse is a rodent = the [animal that is a] mouse is a rodent;

The tiger lives in the jungle = the [animal that is a] tiger lives in the [place that is a] jungle;

The Incas did not use the wheel = the [people that is] Incas did not use the [instrument that is a] wheel.

The problem, however, is that some uses of common names, which do not differ from similar ones, do not allow the same semantic description. So, for example, we can say:

Euclid described a parabola = Euclid described the kind of curve that is a parabola;

Euclid described curves;

* Euclid described the curve.

The reason for these differences is, apparently, in the degree of the hierarchy of the genus: names that are "too generic" are not used in singular as individual names. In the above examples, the name of the curve is "too generic". Mr Vendler concludes the question of whether a name with adjunction is an individual name cannot be decided on the basis of the sentence in which it is used. Mr Vendler introduces a very useful assumption: the expression "that X which" is an individual name if and only if the phrase "the X who…" semantically entails from a wide context. Continuing the discussion in this direction, we run the risk of retreating into the realm of secondary importance for taxonomy, to the realm of contextual individual names, or the use of names as individual ones.

Thus, the semiological idea that the lexical content remains unique and non-identical makes it possible to resolve the question of the opposition 'noun'/'verb' in the languages of the world.

1.2. Metamorphism

As stated above, we have been able to isolate three functions of the utterance on the basis of preliminary research, and, consequently, three elementary functions of language in general: nomination, predication, and location. Nomination performs the task of naming the objects of reality, predication, that of connecting the named, predicated object in an evaluative utterance, location, that of orienting or localizing the named and predicated object in time and space with respect to the speaker. These functions are based on formal elements, present in the utterance, which serve as their formal apparatus. The functions themselves cannot be unreservedly qualified either as "content" or as "expression"; their essence is in the marrying of the two.

The primary formal apparatus of the nominative function of language consists of characterizing signs constituting the nominal and verbal classes. As for the nouns, four independent classifications can be identified in the world's languages, based on totally different principles: 1) active-inactive classes, 2) animate-inanimate classes, 3)

suffixal and prefixal classes, 4) grammatical genders. Some of those classifications can coexist in one language.

According to Mr Stepanov "active-inactive" classes of nouns are clearly represented in many Amerindian languages, characterized as "active structure" languages. For example, in Navaho nouns designating people, animals, trees and plants belong to the active class, and the names of all other objects and phenomena to the inactive (water, snow, cloud, earth, stick, etc.). But, by contrast with the semantics of the nominal classes of the "active structure" languages, we find here, alongside the division of objects by the principle "like man, active" and "unlike man, inactive", more abstract classes, such as "collective nouns", "place-names", etc.

The category "animate-inanimate", which is directly connected with the situation of intercourse between partners in a dialogue and, consequently, does not belong to the apparatus of nomination, is, nevertheless, a constant factor in the renewal of noun classifications, a factor in the transition from one noun classification to another in the development of language. This idea was first formulated by Mr Grasserie at the end of the nineteenth century. He called attention to the way the opposition between active, living, animate and inactive, lifeless, inanimate is constantly supported in dialogue by a number of means – the difference between interrogative pronouns.

Metamorphism, which we trace here, is defined as the identical value of linguistic categories either with identical referents in different syntactic contexts, or, vice versa, with different referents in identical syntactic contexts, as an example of the second type the correlation of two classes of pronouns-adverbs: "I-here-now" and "he-there-then" (table is taken from Stepanov's works).

Function	**Primary apparatus I**	**II**	**III**
Location	Autoreferential words *I — here — now* in the act of utterance	Relative pronouns and adverbs *he-there-then*; spatial cases; category of precedence and category of tense in the verb	So-called "grammatical" cases; category of modality
Nomination	"Active-Inactive" classes in nouns; "active-stative" classes in verbs	Suffixal and prefixal classes in nouns: diathesis and Aktionsarten in verbs	Genders; verbal voices and aspects
Predication	Combination of word-signs in the act of utterance; primary nominal syntagm of the stone wall type	Nominal clause; verbal clause (where nominative and locative functions are present)	Compound sentence

The signs of the system of location "I – here – now" may be united with signs of the system of nomination. This combination forms the basis of the formation and transformation of the group of local cases that rest on the system of coordinates *here – there – in the forest, hither – thither – to the forest,* etc. Here the deixes of spatial indication are directly or indirectly, via prepositions, linked with the signs of nomination forest, house, evening, etc.

CHAPTER II

SENTENCE TAXONOMY

2.1. Structural Scheme of a Sentence

The concept “structure scheme of a sentence” has been successfully applied to the study of individual grammars, i.e. languages. So the development of the structure of the Slavic sentence is considered in close connection with the formation of grammatical categories of the Slavic verb; and this foundation is a task for further study of lexical occurrences. In the same vein of ideas, a team led by Mr Ambrazas (Vilnius) created a new “Lithuanian Grammar” [1985], in which the archaic Lithuanian syntax appeared in a new light due to the consistent correlation of structural schemes with vocabulary.

Working in this direction, Mr Veyrenc (Paris) made a fundamental theoretical generalization. He synthesized the concept “structure scheme of a sentence” and its lexical content in a new concept – “grammar scheme of a sentence”. Mr Veyrenc showed that “diathesis of the verb” and “the object of the verb” are the same phenomenon. Since the object (direct or indirect) appears in the form of a particular case, insofar as the theory of cases and the theory of collaterals are two parts of the same theory.

The conclusion by Mr Veyrenc about the direct connection between the diathesis of the verb and the case of the name can be considered as a theoretical justification for specific reconstructions of some IE types of sentences. So, Mr Veyrenc showed that at the base of the construction (1) *donare aliquid alicui* lies the seme “to be” (Something is by somebody), while at the base of the synonymous construction (2) *donare aliquem aliqua re* lies the seme “have” (Someone has something). The reconstruction of Mr Haudry, carried out on Latin and Vedic material, showed the historical reality of the transition from (1) to (2). The marked historical development from (1) to (2) can thus be directly related to the development of the verb ‘to have’ from the typologically simpler “to be by”.

For languages with a nominative-accusative structure, a full set of types, i.e. theoretically possible combinations of subject, verb and object, is as follows, according to Mr Stepanov:

Type I: Inactive subject + inactive verb;

Type II: Active subject + active verb;

Type III: Active subject + active verb + inactive object;

* Type IV: Active subject + verb + active object;

** Type V: Inactive subject + verb + inactive object;

*** Type VI: Inactive subject + verb + active object.

The first four structural-semantic schemes described by sign ‘activity/inactivity’ are the main types of the PIE sentence (major sentence types).

The order of Mr Stepanov's numbering of types is to a certain extent motivated. On the first place is put the most evident type. The concept "inactive subject" is defined as 'thing' or 'similar things'. The corresponding class of predicates refers to essences such as 'to stand', 'to lie', 'to stick out', 'to break', 'to burst', 'to pour', 'to thaw', etc. On the contrary, the term "active subject" seems to be less clearly delineated. Does it include only entities such as 'man'? Or, if we consistently expand this class, all animated entities, including animals? Or all living things, including plants, for example, fruit trees? Or, finally, everything active, even not having a life cycle, for example, wind?

It remains, however, the fact that in some key concepts of the language system, for example, 'water', the name of an inactive entity goes back to the same root in different IE languages, while the names of the corresponding active essence are more diverse and represented by different roots in different parts of IE area.

Based on non-IE material, in the mainstream of the same approach, a study by Mr Silverstein was carried out earlier. The observational material of the Australian linguist was the phenomenon of the so-called "split ergativity", i.e. such cases when some syntactic constructions are made out in an ergative type, while others, in the same language, in a nominative-accusative type. Mr Silverstein rejected the concept "morphological subject" (surface subject), since this concept is not constant, but variable, depending on the structure of a particular name group in the sentence. He arranged the potential subjects of action in a single hierarchy, including not only the names of objects of reality, but also the designations of the participants in the speech act, respectively the pronoun. The hierarchy is as follows (from left to right): + or - signs mean the presence or absence of this semantic attribute; + tu / - tu / + ego / -ego / + proper name / - proper name / + animate / - animate / ... etc. According to Mr Silverstein, the hierarchy begins with *tu* (Latin designation for 'you'), since this is the most relative concept created only in the act of speech, whereas the ego ('I') precedes the act of speech. By applying this hierarchy, the author came to assumption: "noun phrases" in the top of the hierarchy reveal nominative-accusative marking of cases, while the group "names" in the bottom of the hierarchy reveal "ergative-absolutive" system. The middle portion is often determined by "nominative-dative" constructions.

All these data substantially supplement the notions of proper lexical and pronoun occurrences in the PIE sentence. In addition, an important methodological principle can be extracted from the accumulated observations. Since the hierarchy is mobile, and in IE languages, the boundaries of subjective occurrences are also expanding, the main types of sentences defined above appear at different stages of history with different lexical content. Therefore, it is necessary to define the concept "propositional type" more strictly for the first stage of reconstruction. We call this restriction "the principle of minimization": at the initial stage of reconstruction, it is necessary to consider only the minimal classes of tokens whose occurrences (as whole classes) are necessary and sufficient to determine the type.

We must, therefore, have a hypothesis about which nouns and verbs, with respect to the PIE language, correspond to the semantic attributes "active-inactive".

Our hypothesis consists of two separate parts – the semantic representation of the actresses of sentences, primarily subjects, and the semantic representation of predicates.

In relation to actants (primarily subjects), the sign “inactive” means ‘a thing’, ‘body’ or ‘similar to a thing’, ‘body’. This feature establishes precisely the minimal correspondence between the position of the subject and the lexical class that can act in this position. The opposed semantic attribute “active” can mean ‘plant’, ‘animal’, ‘person’ or their sum, i.e. ‘everything with an active’, ‘life cycle’. The sign “active” in relation to the PIE language is less defined, varied and mobile. (This corresponds, in particular, to the fact that the names of inactive entities, for example, “water”, go back to the same root in different Indo-European languages, while the names of the corresponding active entity, “water as an active principle”, etc., more diverse and represented by different roots in different parts of the IE area). In general, the semantic representation presented here is rather traditional; it corresponds to the theory of “animate-inanimate” genera of Mr Brugman, Mr Meie, and others.

With regard to predicates (i.e., primarily to verbs), our point of view is more original. Under the same minimality condition (that is, only classes of tokens that are minimally necessary and sufficient for the existence of these types of sentences are considered): 1) type I predicates correspond to perfecta tantum verbs, more precisely, verbs that in the Homer language constitute perfecta tantum group with the meaning “body conditions” and their extragreek correspondences; 2) the type II predicates correspond to the verbs, i.e. activa tantum.

Even the most superficial observations on the distribution of vocabulary in the main types of sentences (and this, according to the general hypothesis, the oldest types) reveal a remarkable fact: the classification of sentences by subjects and the classification of the same sentences by predicates coincide only partially. This is expressed primarily in the fact that type II (active sentences) can have the subject as an “active entity” (‘man’, ‘beast’, ‘wind’, ‘river’, ‘water as an active principle’, ‘fire as an active principle’, etc.) and in this case its predicate is usually a verb from the class activa tantum. But in the same type II, the subject can emphasize the human “active essence”, namely just “man”, and then the predicate appears to be mainly a verb from the media tantum class.

On the other hand, in the perfecta tantum class in the Homer language and in their extremal correspondences, there are not only verbs denoting “states of the body”, but also verbs denoting “states of mind”, i.e. purely human states (let us call the first group “a”, the second group “b”). In group “b” a synonymous lexeme is often a verb from the realm of media, and sometimes media tantum. The incomplete coincidence of classifications of sentences by subjects and by predicates can be summarized by the following scheme:

Type I predicates (inactive)		**Type II predicates** (active)	
group A	***group B***	***group A***	***group B***
perfecta tantum	*perfecta tantum*	*media tantum*	*active tantum*
(“state of body”)	(“state of mind”) (subject “human being”)		

The change in PIE deep structure from active to nominative-accusative is reflected in the shifting of the dominant classification from nouns to verbs. The verb thus evolved the binary transitive/intransitive distinction, in replacement of the fading active/ inactive taxonomy of the noun. If so, the stage described here coincides with the transition and temporary coexistence of the two classifications.
Another explanation, however, is possible. As a complicating factor the category "animate personal' may have arisen. It does not seem to be pure chance that the disagreement of the two classifications is most prominent when in a sentence emphasis is laid upon the characteristics of subject as "human", "personal", that is, this subtype of subject is opposed to all other active subjects.

The above is characterized by the distribution of tokens by type of sentence as a predicate of the latter. As for the paradigms by which these tokens conjugate, any radical division of them into "rows" or "series" that would go through all layers of reconstruction is hardly possible, because the paradigms underwent a significant restructuring in the grammatical system of each individual IE language. You can specify only the most general lines of opposition, for example, these: between the forms of the athematic presenter-aorist (characterized as active), on the one hand, and all the others – athematic media, thematic media, perfection and, in the Hittite conjugation in *-hi*, with other. The opposition between the asset and the perfect is apparently the oldest. Initially, there were probably no paradigmatic connections between the two tokens. So, according to the thesis of Mr Bader, "root verbs are either activa tantum or media tantum". The main line of this book is precisely the lexical oppositions directly related to the syntax.

2.1.1. Predicates or Relations

The problem is that from some point of view predicates are not named at all. Meanwhile, the language contains special names of predicates – verbs. What is their place in vocabulary taxonomy? Obviously, due to the relation of verbs with predicates, this is a question not only of the taxonomy of the dictionary, but also the organization of the sentence.

We define a verb as a complex unit of the Dictionary, which means, firstly, some predicate, and secondly, some semantic attribute of the name (term-subject or object). Thus, unlike names and predicates that have their own classifications (taxonomies), a complete classification of verbs should find its place in the sentence section, and such a classification, generally speaking, can hardly be universal; it is always a classification within a specific language.

Attempts to create a universal classification of verbs on a morphological basis have failed. Perhaps the best result of the "pre-semiological" stage of this taxonomy was summarized by Mr Benveniste. The fact is that such concepts as "a process" or "an object" do not reproduce the objective properties of reality, but are already the result of a linguistic expression of reality, and this expression cannot but be peculiar in every language. So, there are languages, such as Hopi, where the verb does not

imply absolutely temporal relevance; in other languages, for example, in the language of Tubatulabal, the Past Tense is expressed not in the verb, but in the name: *hanil* "house", *han-pi-1* "a house in the past" ("that which was a house and is no longer it is now"). It follows that the distinction between a name and a verb cannot be based on an empirical analysis of the facts of morphology.

Therefore, to characterize the contrast between a verb and a name, we are entitled to use such concepts as "an object" and "a process", nor such categories as time, nor morphological differences. Nevertheless, the desired criterion exists, and it is syntactic in nature. It is associated with the function of the verb in the utterance. We will define the verb as a necessary element in the construction of a complete affirmative statement. The verb function (in the form in which we defined it) turns out to be to a certain extent independent of the verb form, although they often coincide.

The point of view on this question of semiological grammar grows from the previous typological point of view, successfully summarized by Mr Benveniste. Semiological grammar considers the contrast between "action" and "thing", or "verb" and "name" as asymmetric: while the allocation of the "name" is ultimately based on the reflection of the phenomena of objective world, the allocation of the "verb" is based primarily on the structure of the sentence, and the objective basis here is intralingual. This position brings us back to the predicate problem.

From a semiological point of view, the "verb function" and "verb lexeme" are separated and distinguished. A "verb function" is nothing more than a predicate of a sentence of any type (including verb-free sentences, nominal sentences, etc.); its full characterization includes not only a description of the predicate itself, but also a description (in general form) of those names that it connects within the framework of the sentence – subjects and objects. The proposed innovation consists in the fact that the categories of Aristotle are considered in semiological grammar as taxonomy of predicates.

With such a categorization of predicates, the problem of their naming arises again. First of all, there are terms "predicate" and "predicator". A "predicator" is a language expression existing in a given language, a function that encompasses a whole group of sentences, as a result of applying a function to names. In a logical sense, a "predicate" is the meaning of a function common to the whole group of such sentences. In linguistics, each individual expression, which is a separate act of applying the predicator, is also called "a predicate". For example, "... sostoyat' v ..." is a predicator of the Russian language, "...consister en (a, dans)..." is a similar predictor of the French language, etc. A value that is the same for all two is a predicate (in a logical sense), and it can be described by any of the two given predicator expressions.

Since the categories of Aristotle were advanced on the basis of the ancient Greek language and described in this language, they are predicators of it. But Aristotle attached universal importance to his categories, regardless of the type of language. In this sense, they should be called, therefore, predicates in a logical sense of the word.

2.1.2. Sentences or Propositional Functions

Since the structural scheme of a sentence is a propositional function, its content is determined by 1) the type of a predicator; 2) semantic sphere of names included in the predicate; 3) the type of a name.

Propositional function itself takes a form of an affirmative sentence, but contains variables that are defined generally. Propositional functions become sentences when replacing variables with certain constants – names with the help of general quantifier ("All *x* are .."), or existential quantifier ("There are *x* such that ...."). Therefore, we consider quantifiers and negatives as predicates that differ from other predicates in that they are applied not to names, but to entire propositional functions or sentences.

The stated taxonomy of syntax is far from possible in any linguistic direction. Generative concepts that emphasize transformations of syntactic constructions do not know the taxonomy of units. Phonemes, morphemes, words (tokens) can be counted. Their number is finite. The number of sentences is infinite. Phonemes, morphemes, words (tokens) have distribution at their level. For sentences, there are neither distribution laws, nor laws of use...

2.1.3. Sentence Agreement

An agreement with the whole length of a sentence, in contrast to the "short agreement" within the syntagma (e.g., an adjective with a noun in gender or number), is a very important, perhaps the most important, feature that determines the formal unity of the sentence. This phenomenon in syntax has been already paying attention in the classical work of Mr Korsh where a typologically significant division of languages into two groups was proposed:

1) languages that connect parts of complex sentences primarily through the index of words (Eng. *that*);

2) languages using for this purpose mainly interrogative-relative words.

However, only in recent years the universal principle of "long agreement" started to develop, acting on the basis of the categories of certainty/uncertainty, the references, anaphora, etc., as well as on the role of the particles in this function. It was shown that logical words, including particles, have graduated in length (in the sentence) spheres of action. Also the localization function in connection with "long agreement" was investigated. All this makes it possible now to put the problem of syntactical agreement in a more general form.

The notion "agreement" is implicit in the above description of the main types of IE sentences. Since these types are established upon the compatibility of the name of a certain class with the verb of the corresponding class, so far as, obviously, between the name and the verb combined within the sentence there is a certain semantic correspondence in each type (for example, "activity", "inactivity"). This correspondence is in general the field of semantics. Therefore, Mr Stepanov calls "long component" of the sentence "semantic" in this sense.

The basis of semantic agreement in the final analysis is the correlation of predicate and actants of a sentence with extralinguistic entities; actants correlate with objects, and predicates with signs and relations of the same objects. Thus, there is a close relationship between semantic agreement within a sentence and its reference to the outside world. Semantic agreement and external reference are the same phenomenon in two varieties. As we will try to show below, there is also a pairwise relationship between other (non-semantic) types of agreement and other types of reference.

There is another kind of agreement in the field of syntactics, which should therefore be called "syntactic". An example of it is the coordination by means of the so-called relative words such as Eng. *which*, *what*, etc., and also through the various kinds of anaphor type like IE **yo*. Of course, the syntactic coordination does not exist without some semantics, but it, in any case, does not consist in direct correlation with the objects of the external world. This type of agreement, like the previous one, is connected with some types of reference, primarily with the co-reference.

Finally, in addition to semantic and syntactic agreement, there is a third type – agreement within location. It is based on the correlation of the utterance and/or its individual elements with the participants of the act of speech – 'I', 'you', 'he' and through them with time and place of speech. This type of coordination, as mentioned above, is also associated with one special type of reference, namely, the reference to the persons participating in the act of speech.

The question now needs to be asked: what is the form of the long component, i.e. the form of agreement in the IE sentence?

If we remain in a limited area of semantics, it seems that the form of semantic agreement or semantic long component is not directly observable, that it is a pure grammatical convention (rule) of a given language. The speaker (and linguist) knows that the names of the active class must be combined with the verbs of the active class, but there is no formal similarity between the indicators of names and the indicators of verbs – some of them morphologically do not resemble the others. Classes of names and classes of verbs in this case appear to the researcher as "informative independent" from each other. Really, in modern IE languages, this is the case for almost all types of sentences. "The stone lies" and "A Man lies" apparently does not detect differences in their long components. These modern IE languages are fundamentally different from languages with consistent classes of names, for example, from Bantu. Here a certain indicator, usually a prefix, means a class of names, extending from this name – if it is used as a subject – to the entire sentence; in Swahili: *pa-hali ha-pa pa-dogo pa-zuri pa-ni-pendeza* "This is a small beautiful place I like" where *pa* is the prefix of the class of names denoting different places. Thus, the agreement in the Bantu is based on semantics.

The languages of the active system with respect to the form of agreement occupy an intermediate position between the languages of the class system of the Bantu type and the languages of such a system as modern IE. Classes of active and inactive names, as well as active and inactive (static) verbs, are deprived of their own indicators, but their belonging to a certain lexical class or subclass (the number of the

latter can be very large) is revealed in the sentence and formally through the indicators acquired there by the given name and verb. In the languages of the active system, in which there are two – active and inactive – series of personal indicators of the verb, it is always possible to determine the subject of the active type of sentence: it is the name that corresponds to the active personal suffix of the verb-predicate. On the contrary, an inactive personal affix in the composition of the active verb-predicate word form is correlated with the object complement (or the nearest object complement is incorporated into the predicate group without any indicator). This construction – with indicators of both subjective (subject-oriented, non-centric) conjugation and object (object-oriented) conjugation – is a form of "long agreement" in the languages of the active system.

Modern IE languages, as already noted above, in the sphere of semantic agreement seem to be amorphous, since the form of semantic agreement between the predicate and its actants almost knows no restrictions and is based on pure grammatical conventions such as the fact that (if, of course, to exclude metaphors) in the Russian language it is impossible to say **I am dark*, in English **I am raining*, etc. Nevertheless, this convention in the past was of a more definite character.

However, the IE technique of agreement is different from the technique of active and class composition. The agreement's indicator is not the own indicator of the verb or the actant, as in active languages, and especially not the indicator of the class name, as in class languages, but any external particle (such as Lat. *dum* – IE **-dṃ-*, Balto-Slav. *-si* – IE **seu̯*, etc.). This suggests that the method of agreement, similar to the method of active system (subject and object conjugation), in the IE languages is only a special case, adapted to some other, more general agreement technique (or, on the contrary, adapted it to itself). This IE technique is of a synthetic nature and should be considered separately.

It is simply a repetition of the same morphological element, which is quite similar to the corresponding phenomenon in the Bantu languages. However, here the nature of this element is unimportant: it can be morpheme-flexion, preposition-preverb, particle, pronoun or, finally, a full word – actant of the sentence. In order to achieve agreement, it is only important that this element is repeated in different parts of the sentence – in the subject group and in the predicate group; in the group of the name itself and in the group of its definition; in the protasis and apodosis of a complex sentence, etc. Thus, the elementary syntactic form of agreement is really of elementary – pictorial, iconic – character. An example in modern English is such cases as *in-cut in...* by a simple verb *to cut*. In Latin, it is agreement of a noun with an adjective: *hort-us bon-us* 'good garden', *puell-a bon-a* 'good girl'.

Changing its position in the sentence, such a detachable element is included in different paradigmatic classes (different "parts of speech"), but its fixation in a particular class is obviously the latest. An example is a particle **per*, occurring in different syntactic positions, as enclitic, then as a preposition-preverb (although it is impossible to agree that they are two distinct IE word).

In addition to the repetitions of particles, it is also widespread repetition of full-meaning words – the actants of the sentence (paronomasia). This type of repetition

usually serves as a connection not inside, but outside of a simple sentence, combining several simple repetitions into one complex. In this variety, IE repetition merges with repetition as a universal syntactic means of communication, presented in the languages of different families.

Location agreement is in all types of agreement – in repetition of some elements in different parts of the sentence. But the repeated indexes here are the pointers of the place and time of the statement "I – here – now", "you – here – now", "he – there – then", i.e. different deixis. In modern IE languages, the repeated element is usually heterogeneous members of the synonymic series, for example, 'I' in the group of subject + morpheme of 1st p. sg. and Present Tense in the verb-predicate + 'here' in the group of adverbial modifier of place + 'now' in the group the adverbial modifier of time. In ancient IE languages, a repeating element is often a special deictic particle.

2.1.4. Three Universal Semantic Models: Active, Ergative, Nominative

The interruption of the long semantic component, discussed in the previous chapter, creates the necessary contrast between the parts of the sentence. If for simplicity we accept that the sentence has three parts – "subject", "verb", "object" (SVO) – and the subject precedes the object, then we can indicate at least three forms of natural language for creating the necessary semantic contrast in the utterance. Three types of contrast are determined depending on where the influence of the long component spreads from, on which term it is interrupted, and how the contrast is created. We call these forms "patterns of utterance".

The "Who-What" Model. In this model, the subject ("who") dominates the object ("what") and domination is carried out through the semantic attribute "animation". This means that, of the two names associated with the *aRb* relation, the name belonging to the category animateness will be the subject and will dominate over the object, which generally belongs to the category of inanimateness. The sign "animation" can be replaced by a more general sign "activity".

In modern Russian, sentences with an uncertain relationship between subject and object are interpreted in favor of that member which is animated with respect to the inanimated or more active with respect to the less active. There is a tendency to put the subject in first place, for example: "Child hits the ball".

The active structure of a language can be briefly defined as a type of language whose structural components are focused not on the transmission of subject-object relations, but on the relations existing between active and inactive participants in the proposition. In accordance with this, the verbs are lexicalized on the basis of activity/non-activity and not on transitivity/intransitivity, and the substantives are divided into active (animated) and inactive (inanimate). Correspondingly, the syntax here is the correlation of active and inactive sentence constructions, and in

morphology – the opposition of the active and inactive series of personal indicators of the verb or the active and inactive cases of the name, etc.

Activeness includes, in general, the designation of people, animals, plants, inactiveness – the names of all other objects and phenomena. This division of names corresponds to the division of verbs. Verbs of the active class convey the actions of active objects, verbs of the inactive class convey the actions of inactive ones. The first are, for example, 'be born', 'die', 'grow', 'go', 'run', 'jump', 'fall', 'say', 'lie', 'eat', 'cut', 'break', 'hold'. Inactive verbs denotes the state of objects of the inactive class, for example, 'hang', 'wallow', 'hang around', 'roll', 'be tall', 'be long', 'be heavy', 'be clean', etc. The so-called two-diathesis verbs that can express in the IE languages both transient and intransitive action, such as French *bruler*, *casser* are absent in the languages of the active system. Similar meanings there are always distinctly distributed between two verb tokens, one of which is active, such as "burn", the other is "static", such as "to be on fire". Two types of sentences predominate – either a combination of the name of the active class with the corresponding verb of the active class, or a combination of the name of the inactive class with the corresponding verb of another class. The necessary object, the correspondence to the "direct object" of IE languages, is practically absent. The prevailing word order is SOV (subject – object – verb), and the case paradigm of the name, as a rule, is not developed.

The system of active languages represents the most vivid expression of the "Who-What" model in its simpler stage – the separate existence of the "Who + active verb" and "What + active verb" models, in relation to which the "Who-What" model looks like their addition .

The "Who-Whom" Model. In this model, the subject ("who") dominates over the object ("who") and this domination is carried out by cases; the subject is in the form of a nominative, the object is in the form of an accusative, or, generally, the subject is in the form of a direct case, the object is in the form of an indirect case. The semantic restrictions are removed here, the long component of "animation" or "activeness" ceases to be necessary for the contrast of subject and object. However, even a surface reconstruction, at least of some IE languages – the Balto-Slavic languages – shows that this model arose directly from the "Who-What" model: "A boy is reading a book"; "The book attracts the boy"; "The book is exciting". It is clear that this model could also be called the "What-What". There are serious reasons to consider active languages as a stage immediately preceding the evolutionary stage of the languages of the nominative system.

The "Who-What" Model. Here, the object ("what") dominates over the subject ("whom"), but it is difficult to find out in the characteristic by which domination takes place. Usually, several attributes appear in it in a "glued" form, mainly the "transitiveness" of a verb in combination with some other, sometimes, for example, in combination with a sign of time of an action. In this case, actions attributed to one particular time require a given model, and actions attributed to another time require another model. An example of this model is ergative constructions of sentences of different languages, for example, the Abkhaz-Adyghe languages. Some authors

believe that in these languages the ergative construction of a sentence arose as a result of the transformation of constructions characteristic of languages of the active system. It should be noted that this assumption about the origin of this model has a clear meaning only within the framework of the languages of the ergative system, since in others, for example in the IE systems, the ergative or "ergative-like" sentence construction can be a secondary phenomenon.

The position of ergative languages on the evolutionary scale remains currently not quite clear. There are reasons to consider them a mixed type, although, as already mentioned, some authors tend to see in them the stage of transition from an active to a nominative system.

Within the three main models, subtypes can be distinguished. So, in the model "Who-What", the languages of the group Mande (in Africa) give a very bright variety. In them, with almost complete absence of grammatical indicators, the differences between the subject and the object in sentences like "Hunter – kill – the lion" roles are absolutely clear due to the purely lexical indicator – the choice of the verb. Lexemes of the same action differ depending on which class of objects they semantically belong to: "kill" as an action (property) of a hunter is a completely different lexeme than "kill" as an action (property) of a lion. Thus, from the point of view of universal syntax, this is equivalent to the fact that the sentence with "kill" is split into two sentences, in one of which "kill" is dominated by the name of the group "people", in the other – "animals". If both names are used in a particular sentence of Mande languages, then this is equivalent to the fact that in such a sentence the semantically dominant name is a subject. We must take for granted that in the abstract, "universal" sentence, "Man – kill – beast", domination is balanced or indefinite, subjective or objective. These phenomena are also present in Balto-Slavic languages.

Modern French language reveals a peculiar combination of the models "Who-What" and "Who-Whom". It manifests itself in the dual categorical division of the word meanings – the interrogative and relative pronoun, which plays a crucial role for the syntactic characterization of the model. In the initial position of an independent (main) sentence, the *qui* form expresses the category "Singular/Plural" in the function of both the subject ("Who?") and the object ("Whom?"): Qui vous voit? "Who sees you?", Qui voyez-vous? "Who(m) do you see?".

The three named models can be brought into correspondence with the three types of languages according to the typological classification of Mr Klimov. The "Who-What" model corresponds to languages of the active type; the "Who-Whom" model to the nominative type languages, and the "Who-What" model to the ergative type.

2.2. "I"-Sentences, "It"-Sentences

In this taxonomy, we distinguish three groups of sentences according to the nature of their subject: "I"-sentences, "it"-sentences.

“I”-sentences, as their name indicates, are sentences that are pronounced on behalf of ‘I’ – the speaker himself/herself. Their subject can only be the designation of this person – the pronoun ‘I’, the corresponding verb indicator, sometimes accompanying, sometimes replacing the pronoun.

“I”-sentences are characterized by a number of traits peculiar only to them. If for "classic" sentences like “Leaves are green”; “The son went to the city”, etc. it is true that their subject simultaneously performs two functions – reference to the outside world and individualization, then this characteristic is not suitable for “I”-sentences. The subject ‘I’ obviously individualizes; in fact, ‘I’ is the highest degree of individualization that can be achieved by means of language. But the function of reference to the outside world can only be talked about with great restrictions. In fact, with ‘I’ the reference appears by emphasizing of ‘I’. In a typical case, the ‘I’ does not establish references in addition to individualization and does not require any pre-established reference, no “presupposition of reference or existence”; the subject of speech is assumed to exist by the fact of speech itself.

“It”-sentences (they can be called “locus” sentences) are opposed to all the previous ones by the fact that only something inanimate and not even material can act as their subject. The subjects of such sentences are, in a broad sense, indications of place and time. Such subjects carry out only the function of reference to the outside world, but of course we cannot speak of the function of individualization here. The absence of individualization corresponds to the form of the subject: it is usually expressed in Russian by an adverb or an adverbial phrase and, strictly speaking, is not a name in the sense of the word in which a single noun is a name. The development of such sentences in the Russian language is promoted by the relatively free word order in Russian syntax. In a neutral, non-emphatic order of words, the first noun phrase becomes the subject, and the whole sentence becomes the sentence of the type *Gosti – v sadu* is a “classic” nominative sentence with the subject named *gosti*, but *V sadu – gosti* is “it”-sentence, “locus”-sentence with subject-place *v sadu*.

In languages with a non-free word order, this type still exists, although it is implemented by other means. So, in French “Les invites sont dans le jardin”, “Dans le jardin, les invites” or “Il y a les invites dans le jardin”.

The predicate tells us what the thing wants, what it can do. By separating the predicate from the linguistically pronounced judgment, it becomes possible to look into details. The sense of the word *warm*, which is so different from the temperature sensation “warm”, becomes a new base for thinking. All types of sensation of warmth are thereby combined and separated from the exciter of the heat. The sensations of temperature are now grasped as the effects of the center of force newly created by the word *warm*, and this center of power becomes the subject of new judgments. Often it also takes on the form of the noun: “warm” becomes “heat”. But with that, it ceases to be a predicate; it becomes the subject and now autonomous and anthropomorphic. The predicate always remains dependent. The cultured languages developed for verbs and adjectives their own parts of speech, which bear this character of independence and clearly show the relationships to a bearer in the personal endings and genus forms.

It is incompatible with the nature of judgment that it consists only of a predicate. However, such judgments are found in the so-called “Impersonals”. In all IE languages, we find propositions, which seem to designate a simple process without breaking it down into subject and predicate. Such phrases are “It is raining”, “It is snowing”, “It is flashing”, “It is burning”, “It is warm” etc. This form of sentence occurs most clearly in the so-called “meteorological verbs”. In the meantime, however, the form is further developed in some languages, and it is often used in passives in intransitive verbs: “Hier wird getanzt”, “itur”, “ventum est”.

The variety of such propositions in the Slavic languages has led Mr Miklosich to study them. It has been shown that the discussion of this linguistic phenomenon interferes with the question of the nature of judgment. Does the sentence “It’s raining” have a subject or not? And if it has, what is it? Miklosich’s most radical approach concerned Brentano’s psychology. According to him, the Impersonalia are subjectless sentences. They designate a process, an activity without saying whose activity it is. In traditional logic and psychology, Mr Miklosich found no formula for his conception of this linguistic phenomenon. According to Brentano, it does not belong to the essence of judgment to insist on subject and predicate. Judgment is simply recognition or rejection of a mental image, and it makes no difference whether that content is one or two-fold, simple or compound. Mr Miklosich teaches that in the sentences “It is raining”, “It is snowing” the idea of the rain, of the snow is simply recognized. Brentano has welcomed this conception of the Impersonalia and believed in finding a confirmation of his judgment theory. Mr Marty then tried to explain this in detail in his articles on subjectless sentences and to prove that the Impersonalia are to be regarded as existential sentences. Mr Sigwart has also made a detailed classification of the Impersonalia. Even those who consider Brentano’s theory of judgment to be completely wrong can nevertheless see in the impersonals one-part judgments. In the judgment “The tree blossoms”, the uniformly given conception of the content “blossoming tree” is formed and articulated in the manner we describe more frequently. You can tell by the judgment: “It does not rain’. The content of the imagination given by the perception of the rain is experienced by the judgment. However, the strange thing that needs explaining is not the fact that it is not said that it rains but that no cause, no originator of the rain is called.

What distinguishes the meteorological propositions from others is the fact that the rain is not decomposed and is called “falling water”. This led Mr Jerusalem to suppose that in the impersonals we have a part of that period of speech where the root had not yet broken up into subject and predicate, but it was enough to designate an entire process. In fact, even today the meaning of the words *rain, snow, hail*, which unify the thing and activity, seems to be a rest of old language material.

Marty’s conception of impersonals as existential theorems is untenable, full of confusion and inner contradictions. It is not right to say that in language terms “It rains” means something like “Rain is”. This latter mode of expression is uncommon. There is an essential difference between the meanings of sentences “It is raining” and “Rain is”. The sentence “It is raining” is pronounced when someone perceives the rain. Anyone, who hear “It’s raining”, will understand that it is now raining. This

relationship belongs to the constant “meaning” of the present. The listener is asked to introduce the speaker’s environment. In existential sentences, however, such a request is not evident. As soon as one says, “It is raining”, the form of the existential theorem gives “Rain is”, and the meaning of the present immediately shifts. The sentence no longer means “Here in this environment it is raining now”, but it means that there is such a thing as rain in the world at all. To point out this fact is seldom an occasion, and if it is the case, at any rate, “Rain is” means something entirely different from “It is raining”.

2.2.1. Sentences of Condition with Aorist

In general, as a class, the Balto-Slavic sentences of condition are characterized by two main features: 1) in them, there is a significant opposition of subjects that can be identified with the person who says “I” to all other subjects; 2) their predicates are based on the IE forms of the Past Tense, according to which two main predicate types are distinguished – predicates based on Perfect forms, and predicates based on preterite forms – aorist and imperfect; the aorist class, in turn, is closely associated with the formation of species differences in the Slavic verb. Perfect predicates gravitate to “I”-subjects, that is, they are marked. Aorist predicates are unlabeled and combine with subjects of both the personal and non-personal classes: “The boy does not write”; “Pencil does not write”.

The semantic grounds for the new contrasts were that the subject of the active action, expressed as the basis of the Present Tense, and the subject of Preterite were often different.

1. The Greek type is the paradigm of one verb with an ablaut between a Present Tense with a full step and an aorist with a reduced step and often with opposite diathetic meanings of different members of the paradigm.

2. The Slavic type is paradigms of two different verbs that have retained ablaut only in rare cases and correlated as a verb of a “definite” (Perfect) form / “indefinite” (Imperfect) form, often with one or more verbs with a causative or iterative meaning and in this case, with an ablaut of a new origin, arising as an extension of the short vowel.

3. The Baltic type is paradigms of two different verbs, always with an IE type of ablaut, correlated as a verb of a state or action occurring in a subject (person or thing) – a causative verb (sometimes with far divergent lexical meanings).

Mr Stepanov believes that the center of development in this class was the theming of the IE originally athematic paradigms. In modern IE studies, the existence in the pra-IE athematic paradigms with an ablaut between singular and plural forms postulated as well as with the so-called secondary (actually historically primary) endings: sing. **léik^{w}-m*, pl. **lik^{w}-mé*, etc.

In the process of theming, this paradigm automatically generates two rows of so-called polarized forms: а) **léik^{w}-óm, *léik^{w}-és*, etc.; б) **lik^{w}-óm, *lik^{w}-és*, etc. In Greek, two series of paradigms are most distinctly contrasted in thematic verbs as

“present” (actually present and imperfect) or as an aorist. The formal and semantic distribution of stems is the same as in Lithuanian pairs: 1) (pa)lieka – (pa)liko (‘leaves’, ‘remains’ – ‘left’, ‘remained’); 2) melžia – milžo (‘milks’ – ‘milked’); 3) merkia – mirko (‘someone is wetting’ – ‘something is wet’).

The core of the Baltic opposition “causal action / causal process or condition” was (in the ablaut class) the opposition of two forms: 1) the form with full degree of vocalism in the root and with the meaning of the active action associated with the 1st person, and 2) the form with a reduced stem and the meaning of an intransitive aorist associated with the 3rd person: 1) **leik-* / 2) **lik-*.

If you look at Greek material from this point of view, it sheds light on the relationship between the Baltic (and partly Slavic) ablautic class with state verbs characterized by indicators of the basis *-i-/-e-* (like *mini/mineti*). Simple thematic paradigms such as *leika/liko* (*leik-/*lik-) are replaced in the Baltic with a newer type with *je/o*-present: *melžia/milžo* (formerly melža/milžo) ‘to milk’; *lenkia/linko* ‘bend’, etc. In Greek, *je/o*-present often carries an *ē*-aorist. Suffix *ē* generally means a state occurring as a result of an action and is combined in conjugation with the indicator *-i*. At the same time, presence and aorist express the state of one and the same subject, usually a person, in one paradigm. It is noteworthy that the subject of the state is a person, even in those cases when it comes to physical actions. The reduced root vocalism stands here in accordance with semantics. This type is usually compared with the Balto-Slavic **mini-//-*minē-*.

However, there is another type in Greek: present on *-je/o-* or *-e/o-* with full degree and with reduction by the active subject with aorist on *-ē*. In Baltic, this type needs to be matched with the presentation of the *lenkia* type. As in Greek, the basis of *ē*-preterite refers equally to both types of present: *linki – linke-jo* and *lenkia – lenke*. In the first case, the subsequent extension of the stem (linke-jo) corresponds to the value of the state in this type of verbs and to the Slavic imperfect. In the second case, the full level of root vocalism, unusually by the suffix *-ē-*, indicates that the latter was adopted to the stem of *je/o*-present. However, the ancient Greek language, as a rule, seeks to avoid the presence of two intransitive aorists with the same root – *e/o*-preterite and *ē*-preterite – while Balto-Slavic, on the contrary, possesses such parallel forms, giving them a functional difference “action/state”.

Thus, in the ablaut class the pro-Balto-Slavic paradigm is restored (1): presens of TeRT-e/o- – 1st preterite TiRT-e/o- – 2nd preterite, “state aorist” or “primary Balto-Slavic imperfect” TiRT-ē // TiRT-ā. This paradigm is preserved only in the form of fragments: la) lenda ‘climbs’ – lindo ‘has climbed’ (1st *a*-preterite, replacing e/o-preterite) – lindo ‘sits climbed’ (2nd *a*-preterite, reinterpreted as presens of a new state verb *lindo, lindojo, lindoti*); 1b) the same, but with the 2nd preterite on *-ē-* linde-jo (extended by suffix and with a new present from the IE perfect *lindi*, as well as a new verb of the state *lindi, lindejo, lindeli*).

The presence of two different preterites in one paradigm has become one of the most important factors in the split of Slavic lexemes into species pairs and the Baltic lexemes into diathesis pairs. This class also includes the verbs of the group “sit down”, “become”, “lie down”.

2.3. Relation-Sentences

The relation-sentences are peculiar when nothing else is asserted in them, as the presence of existence of a certain relationship. This seems to be the case in the mathematical formulas and in the so-called "hypothetic sentences". The formula $(a + b)^2 = a^2 + 2ab + b^2$ or the equation $x = 4$ as a result of resolution are undoubtedly judgments. If one took the left side of the equation as the subject, the right as the predicate, then the meaning of the equation would be $x = 4$: "It is the property of x to be equival to 4". Now, without prejudice to the correctness the predicate might become a subject. But with this the feature of the subject and the predicate is lost. If one examines exactly what is actually claimed when one writes the equation, one will admit that the equality relation between the two quantities is the most important object of the statement. We do not want to give a property of x, but we say that between x and 4 is the equality relation. The subject of such judgments is accordingly the equality relation between the two magnitudes, and the predicate is the existence, the existence of this relation. Existence, however, means nothing more than the ability to act and the effectiveness.

The relationship of equality will prove to be effective in all subsequent operations. It is often the case that if the expression to the left is a subject and to the right is a predicate. However, this appearance lasts only as long as the left side still has something unknown. But as the equation is fully understood, this conception is lost. Both sides of the equation then stand independently by themselves, and only the relationship existing between them is now the subject of the assertion. In the case of geometric sentences, the matter is somewhat different. The relationship between cathetus and hypotenuse is certainly taken as a property of the right-angled triangle, the equation $y^2 = 2px$ certainly as a property of the parabola. But in the equation $a^2 + b^2 = c^2$ or $y^2 = 2px$ it is by no means one of the members of the subject but only the relation itself. Mathematic judgments are therefore the purest judgments of relationship that exist, and they assert nothing in them except the existence of relationships. These relationships are by no means to be considered as merely thinkable. These are effective forces and prove to be efficacious in the objective processes.

2.4. Sentences of Identity

From the point of view of the long semantic component, sentences of conditional identities are under the category of temporality/timelessness, but they also combine, in addition, a whole bunch of categories – existence, individuality, community, etc.

The concept of existence, like every other concept, is the result of an abstraction. The so-called inner perception owes its origin. In the perception of a mental process, the recognition of its existence is a complete self-deception, and this assertion is itself the strongest argument against the doctrine of the evidence of the internal perception.

The concept of existence is a means of thinking, which turns out to be necessary to facts of high generality. Every idea contains the concept of existence implicit in itself. Everything we imagine we have to think of being existent.

The concept of existence is the heightened concept of being. The subject as a judgment element is a bearer of forces. IE languages show by their reduction some peculiarities in this direction. In archaic Latin when asking about some text or the instruction "What is it?", the answer was not "It is a law" but the sentence of existence "The law exists, the law is" ("Quid est?" – "Lex est" instead of "Id est lex").

One group of such facts one can find in Old French. In the sentence "Se est il" – "It is he", *il* was a subject, and *se* was a predicate. In modern language, on the contrary, *se* is a subject, *il (lui)* is a predicate: "C'est lui" – "It is he". Accordingly, in Old French it is unusual, from view of modern language, the connection between such a question and an answer like "Qui est che la", – fait ele, – "Dieu?" Et dist Perchevaus li gentieus: "Pucele, je suis Perchevaus". "Who is here", she asks, "The Lord?" Noble Perceval answers: "Girl, I am Perceval".

Modern Russian is in this regard similar to modern French, differing from Old French. The statement "I (am) Ivan" by response to the question "Who is it?" seems to be illogical. We would rather expect the answer "It is me, Ivan".

In Latin, on the question *Quis est?* – "Who is it?" one answers "ego sum" (1) which is illogical as well as Old French "je suis Perchevaus", because Latin meaning is "I am, I exist"; but in this situation the sentence is "It is me". Compare: "Quis est qui me vocal?" – "Erus atque alumnus tuos sum" (Plautus. Captivi). – "Who is that calls me?" – "I am your master and pupil" (instead of "I, your master and pupil").

If identification relates to the third person, a human being, then the formula remains the same; only the personal form of a pronoun changes. If something identified is a thing, then two formulas are possible. The first overlaps with previous one: "Quid est?" – "Lex est". / "What is it?" – "The Law is (exists)" (2). The second is rarer: "Id est lex". – "It is a law" (3).

It is possible to notice something general that explains why on the question "What is it?" in one cases the answer is "Lex est", in others "Id est lex". In the given examples, the pronoun of neutral gender is used with abstract nouns, and for this reason it becomes a subject. We find the same tendency in Old French with that difference that in Latin it did not become the rule, it is still an exception from rules.

If we group all cases of identification, we will receive the following propositions, expressing the same judgment: 1. Ego sum (I am); 2. Lex est (A law is); 3. Id est lex (It is a law). From these three sentences, only the third (the rarest in Latin) is similar to those of modern French and Russian. Modern French generalizes all three types in one language formula: 1. C'est moi; 2. C'est la loi; 3. C'est la loi. By comparisons with Latin examples, we see that the general form of judgment is other, not general but special language expression.

Thus, the "rule of the subject" is: 1) when determining two names (including the pronoun), the more individual of them is given in favour of the subject; 2) the limit of individuality and concreteness is historically variable. Mr Klimov considered it

possible to use these conclusions when formulating his position on the evolution of the subject in terms of general typology. In addition, the "rule of the subject" can be supplemented with one more assumption: 3) the sentence of identity containing an individual name as well as the sentence of existence ("X exists") are closely related to each other; historically, they are often expressed in the same type of sentence.

2.5. Sentences with Quantors

The quantifier of allness, the quantifier of existence, negation can be considered as predicates or predicators that apply to names, like other predicates, and to whole sentences or propositional functions.

The analogy of quantifiers and negation is that by placing a quantifier of allness, a quantifier of existence or negation in front of a propositional function, as well as replacing variables with a specific (individual) name, so that we get proposition-judgments. In the first case, we get a general sentence, in the second – a sentence of existence, in the third - a single sentence. Here are some examples:

1) the sentence "Scientists are seekers of truth" can be rewritten with the introduction of the quantifier of allness (Vx): "All scientists are seekers of truth".

2) the sentence "Some students are philosophers" can be rewritten with the introduction of the existential quantifier (gx): 'There is *x* such that *x* is both *a student* and *a philosopher*". In a natural language, the existential quantifier often appears in the form of words *some, many, sometimes*, etc.

3) the propositional function from the field of mathematics $x + 3 = x + 4$ can be turned into a sentence by introducing a quantifier of negation "There is no *x* such that $x + 3 = x + 4$".

It is necessary to distinguish sentences with a simple predicate of existence "something exists" (The forest is noisy; The child is sitting; Love exists; There is a machine), from a predicate with an existential quantifier: "There is an *x* that... Judgments with existential quantifier do not claim that there is a certain thing, do not claim existence as a property, they only say that there are things that have a certain property, or things that are in a certain relation to others things.

2.6. Conceptual Judgments

The isolated consideration of concepts has been of great advantage for certain logical purposes. In fact, the concepts are elements of judgment, which only develop "real life" in it. The subject-word in a perceptual judgment is a concept insofar as the word has a general meaning and denotes the individually determined thing. But since in a perception-judgment we have merely this definite thing in mind and regard the process as this definite activity of the thing, the subject-word of the perception-judgment is not a concept in the proper sense but a real object. For instance, when we hear a sound in which we recognize the barking of a dog, we say "A dog barks", we

have in mind a certain dog in that place. By definition, this dog lacks the most important features, namely the general ones. If one wants to call such subjects "individual concepts", he/she misunderstands the nature of the concept. There can be individual concepts by summarizing the permanent features of a single object in relation to the changing such as the spatial and temporal relationships. But in the chosen example as well as in every perceptual judgment, the subject is a very specific individual in a very specific situation. The subject of the linguistically pronounced perceptual judgment is therefore a perceived individual object whose individual peculiarities are co-imagined. If, on the other hand, I say, "The dog is a pet", then in the subject only the general qualities are designated. Characteristic of these judgments is, first of all, that the content is not given as a vivid idea. It is connected with the fact that the present of these judgments contains no relation to "here" and "now", but it is only the linguistic expression for the objective force of the judgment. It is said in such judgments that an existing center of power has "this" and "that" potential effect.

We have already said that there are bearers of forces in the subject-words and in the concepts of objects arising from them. We used the word *force* without specifying it. By making the subject-word the bearer of abilities, the judgment loses its anthropomorphic character. By virtue of the fact that the predicate is also linguistically expressed in particular, it becomes possible to influence forces. The formation of such concepts is prepared by the experience that the same properties are found in different objects. This succeeds only when the property has found its linguistic term as a predicate of a subject. Let us imagine that a primitive man touches a warm stone. Since he is accustomed to feel a stone cold, the heat may arouse his interest, perhaps reminding him of similar sensations that the sun, the fire, had aroused in him. However, as long as no word is formed for this sensation, the heat will remain connected with its pathogen and cannot be separated from it. But if he forms the sentence "Stone warms" or "Stone fires" when touching the warm stone, then this quality or state has an independent position in the consciousness. The word *warm* soon becomes its center of force. The self-made predicate immediately takes on the subject function. "Heat" is now considered as a being: the predicate often takes on the form of a substantive in the role of a thing. This hypostasis of properties has caused many mistakes. We can still see it by Aristotle who honestly and eagerly tries to emancipate himself from language, as he is a being that lives and works round the objects.

If we say today, based on the mechanical theory of heat, that heat is the motion of the molecule, we do not conceive of heat as a substance dwelling and working within the thing, but in this we also see the activity of a thing. Being warm is the effect of the molecules moving in a certain way. By closer examination, it turns out that the molecules are not the last subjects but only complexes of atoms. But these atoms are nothing else than the substrates for activities postulated by the function of judgment. Actually, we never quite get rid of the anthropomorphism. Activities and changing states make the attention easier and stronger than permanent ones. The former will therefore receive their linguistic expressions earlier in predicate words.

The judgments, whose predicates are activities and changing states, were in the Kantian sense "synthetic": the predicate is not yet excited by the subject-word. It will not be so easy to find an opportunity to detach lasting qualities from their bearers and, in the judgment, to make them independent objects of thought. "White" is inherent in the word *snow*, and the word *snow* is always taken into consideration, and it will therefore not be easy to emphasize this feature in a judgment, and thus to be analytic in Kant's sense to form judgment. But without such occasions, the concepts of property could not arise, and we must watch how our thinking comes to releasing permanent properties from their immanence. Such occasions will then find themselves when a thing belongs to a group according to its total impression but shows a peculiarity, which makes it different from the hitherto known individuals of this group.

Let us imagine that someone sees a white rose for the first time. Form and smell lead him to the verdict: "This is a rose". Now, however, this rose differs in color from the previously one, hence "This rose is white". As much as form and smell sufficed to take the present subject as owner of the forces summarized in the name of "rose", the feature of ordinary (red) color was already the sum of potential divorced forces; "Being red" is no longer part of it. On the other hand, the "whiteness" is taken as the actual effect of the forces lying in this rose and predicted by the rose. In the judgment "This rose is white", the given content of the presentation is structured in the same way as in the judgment "The bird flies". The process judged here is not a temporary movement but a permanent effect of immanent forces. The color is taken as an activity of the "rose", and this activity is now practiced in a different way than usual. Only when the sight of white roses repeatedly provokes the verdict "This rose is white" it is reflected in these judgments the term "white rose".

2.7. Sentences of Activeness-Inactiveness

Under this title, Mr Stepanov combines sentences with a two-place predicate such as "A boy is reading a book". Their evolution in the Balto-Slavic area mainly comes down to the development of the category of verbal transitiveness, and we will talk here about the classification of the Balto-Slavic types of transition.

In the PIE category of transitivity in the modern sense of the word did not exist, the same verb could in most cases appear in a transitive and intransitive meaning. Even in modern Balto-Slavic languages, verbal transitiveness, uniform at first glance, hides at least two different historical events. In Lithuanian, the primary verbs with the meaning 'pour', 'prick', 'wet', 'soften', 'peel', etc., require one, namely, direct object, for example: "Kaikas žirnius beria". Their periphrase is paired verbs with intransitive diathesis: "Žirniai byra". A newer shifting of verbs, derived with suffixes and often also with prefixes, expresses a completely different semantic type of transitiveness, for example "Barstyti žirniais kelia". The number of places in the predicate here in principle is not limited to two, and the periphrases of such

expressions differ from the periphrases of the first type, being passive constructions, for example: “Kelias zirniais nubarstytas”.

In Russian, primary verbs can be either transitive or intransitive and, in any case, not requiring a clearly expressed direct object, for example: *igrat’* (play), *brit’* (shave), *strich’* (cut), *chitat’* (read), etc. On the contrary, secondary, derivatives prefixed verbs, if these are transitive verbs, always require an obligatory object: *vyigrat’* (win), *vystrich’* (cut out), *vypisat’* (write out), *perepisat’* (rewrite), etc. For secondary transitive verbs, a passive construction is performed by a paraphrase or transformation: “Something is written out”, etc. In the primary transitive verbs, passive transformations are irregular and often impossible, and periphrases are indefinite.

On the other hand, in Lithuanian, the primary verb means the state of a thing of the type “Peas is pouring”; therefore, to convey the state of a human subject, one uses reflexive verbs derived from an active verb with the meaning of an action of a human subject: *kelti* ‘lift’, ‘to rise’ – a human subject; *kilti* ‘rise’ – subject-thing; *keltis* – human subject. Similar relations exist in Slavic, and the type of the primary verb of the state such as *kilti, birti, mirkli* in Russian is completely replaced by the derivative return; therefore, all such Lithuanian verbs are translated into Russian through transitive ones.

The description of action sentences, we will reduce here to a more limited problem – the description of the predicates by types of transitivity. To describe the types of transitivity (or diathesis, or verb forms) of the Russian language, we will use the following three pairs of signs.

1. In the first place we put forward the sign of analytical/synthetic transitivity (or diathesis). We will use these terms by analogy with analytical and synthetic judgments in logic. A sign of analytical transitivity is characterized by actions whose object is either identified with the action itself or arises as a result of the action and does not exist before it. A sign of synthetic transitivity is characterized by actions, by which a concept is independent of the action. In the first case, the concept of an object can be distinguished from the concept of action, in the second case, it is only attached to it. Therefore, at the surface level, objects of analytical transitivity may not be expressed, while objects of synthetic transition, apparently, must necessarily be expressed. The sign “analytical/synthetic transitiveness” is the largest classification criterion: almost every transitive verb (at least in modern Russian) can be said to have analytical or synthetic transitiveness, and most of the verbs of the Russian language can be of two groups. This is the newest, “youngest” sign in the historical sense; it corresponds to the productive semantic division of verbs, objectively existing in the Russian language of modern times. Examples of synthetic transition: “to cut trees”, “to win a prize”; examples of analytical transition: sing (a song), play a role.

2. Further, the two indicated groups of verbs can be, in turn, each divided into two more groups. Effective transitivity means that the object of action undergoes a real change in the process of action, including the creation or destruction of it. Ineffective transition means that there is an object – given in advance or arising in the process of action – that only participates in the action, without undergoing real

change, since the action does not go beyond the subject. The sign "effective/ineffective transition" corresponds to the more ancient semantic division, which still exists at the present time, but was formerly productive in the Balto-Slavic period, in the common Slavic, Old Slavic and Ancient Greek languages.

The intersection of the 1st and 2nd classification features gives five main classes of transitivity in Russian.

3. However, for an exhaustive description, these features are not enough; some essential features of transitivity – diathesis – are associated with the nature of the subject. The latter imposes restrictions on the type of transitional verb. The classification characteristic of the subject undoubtedly corresponds to the most ancient semantic division of IE languages. Perhaps it corresponds to the division of names into active/inactive classes, which preceded the division of names into grammatical genera. This also stands in connection with the opposition of external diathesis to internal diathesis (media).

2.7.1. Sentences with Inactive Subject + Inactive Verb

As mentioned above, the minimal class of predicates in this type is reconstructed by Mr Stepanov as lexemes corresponding to Homer's *perfecta tantum* with the meaning "state of the body".

In accordance with the indicated verb roots (1)-(7), there are primary names: 1) *δάος* (n.) 'torch', 2) *πάγος* (m.) 'rock', *πάγη* (f.). 'trap', 3) *θάλος, -εος* (n.) 'escape', 'branch', *θάλλος* (m.) 'the same', 4) *σήψ, -πός* (f.) 'rotten wound', *σαπρός* 'rotten', 5) *ὀλοός* 'destructive', 'disastrous', *οὖλος* 'disastrous', 'sinister', 6) there are no specific names, but perhaps you should put here *ὄρνις* (f.) 'bird', *ὄρνεον* (n.) 'the same', 7) *τράχων* 'rocky terrain'.

The general semantics of this whole group of verbal and corresponding nominal roots – "condition of body" – responds well to modern linguistic ideas about the nominal origin of the Perfect from the predicates of nominal sentences. The traces of this origin are preserved in the most ancient meanings of Perfect forms; cf. Gk. *τέτοκα* is applied only to a woman 'I gave birth to…', in contrast to the forms of Presence and Aorist *τίκτω, ἔτεκον* applied to beings of both sexes. If the Perfect had not originally had the meaning of "state of body", then such a restriction of use would be inexplicable.

The Greek *perfecta tantum* also includes several lexemes with the meaning of a certain state as a constant quality: 1) 'to be similar to': *ἔοικα* without correspondences outside the Greek; 2) 'to be ordinary': *εἴωθα*, Ind. *svadhā* 'habit', Goth. *sidus* 'custom', Lat. *sodalis* 'ally'.

The third, quite extensive, group of Homer's *perfecta tantum* consists of lexemes with the meaning of the impact on the senses and semantically related imitatives of the verbs: 1) *ὄδωδα* 'smell', 2) *βέβρυχα* 'groan', 'roar', 3) *μέμυκα* 'moo' and the like.

In separate IE languages, corresponding semanthemes and lexemes are reflected as small compact groups of verbs with anomalous paradigms, most often as Presence Perfect.

In German, this is a group of Presence Perfect, more precisely, a part of this group, semantically and etymologically corresponding to the lexemes with the meaning "condition of body": Goth. *aih* 'own'; Goth. *skal* 'must', cf. Lith. *skolà* 'duty'; Goth. *daug* "useful", cf. Lith. *daūg* 'many'. The other part of the German Presence Perfect is verbs with the meaning "condition of mind".

A special group of Homer's *perfecta tantum*, which at first glance cannot be associated with a group of predicates of type I, "condition of body", but which ultimately reveals its connection with the latter, constitute lexemes with the meaning of mental states of a person, "condition of mind".

Many of the lexemes in both of the main groups of Homer's *perfecta tantum* – "condition of body" and "condition of mind" – have a morphological feature – the absence of *-o-* step in the root. The same peculiarity characterizes the lexemes with the meaning of sound transmission – *βέβρυχα* 'groan', 'cry', *μέμυκα* 'mumble', 'roar', *μέμηκα* 'shout', 'bleat', *κέκλη*, 'cry'. The lexemes without *-o-* at the root form the most ancient type of the ancient Greek Perfect. With this observation, it is necessary to link the conclusions of Mr Bader and others on two morphological types of IE Perfect: one with vocalism *-o-* without doubling, the other with doubling without vowel gradation with zero vocalism. Different IE languages often retain these two types of Perfects. The marked features are morphologically bound, probably, with some features of semantics. As Mr Pulleyblank showed, the *-o-* at the Perfect root is semantically significant with the meaning "direction of action inwards" (introvert). Apparently, the opposed morphological feature – the absence of *-o-* – must also be significant, although today we cannot yet fully characterize the corresponding meaning.

Typological parallels to PIE Perfect can be found in different languages, for example, in Afro-Asiatic languages of the so-called active type. Such parallels are the class of static verbs, opposed to the class of active verbs; the sentence structure corresponds thus to this division.

According to Mr Klimov, the class of static verbs consists mainly of verbs expressing physical state. In some cases, they may also appear in subject from of the active class; therefore, in some American works, they are called "neutral" verbs. These include lexemes of such semantics as 'hang', 'roll', 'fall', 'stick out', 'to be high', 'to be long', 'to be big', 'to be clean', 'to be heavy', 'to be green', 'to be raw', and in general all quality verbs whose meaning in the languages of the nominative-accusative structure is conveyed by the combinations of the verb "to be + adjectives". It is obvious that the class of the static verbs of the languages of the active system as a whole corresponds to the groups "condition of body" and "constant quality" in the archaic Perfect (or *perfecta tantum*) of IE languages.

2.7.2. Sentences with Active Subject + Active Verb

According to Mr Stepanov's hypothesis, the predicates of this type of sentence are IE verbs of *activa tantum*. Mr Delbrück outlined this group based on coincidence of two languages – Greek and Old Indian (Sanskrit and Vedic). According to Mr Delbrück, this includes the following lexemes (semanthemes):

1) 'go': *jigāti, βαίνω* and *βάσκω*, cf. also *jasaiti*, Skr. *gáchati* 'come'; 2) 'bend': *bhujati, here φεύγω* 'run', the semantic relation between 'bend' and 'run' remains unexplained; 3) 'tremble', 'scare', 'flee', 'run': *trásati, τρέω* 4) 'crawl': *sárpati, ἕρπω*; 5) 'blow': *vāti*, cf. Rus. *veyat*'; 6) 'flow', 'expire': *srávati, ρέω*, cf. Rus. *struya, ostrov*; Lith. *srutà*, more often only in pl. *srùtos*; 7) 'eat': *átti, ἔδω*; 8) 'drink': *pibati, πίνω*, not quite identical with *pibati*, but going back to its similar form; 9) 'bite': *dáṣati*, *δάκνω*; 10) 'spit out': *ṣṭhivati, πτύω*; Lith. *spiauti, spiauna* 'same meaning'; 11) 'spew' (vomiting): *vamiti, ἐιέω*, cf. Lith. *vémti, vemia* 'the same'; 12) 'fry': *bhrjyáti, φρύγω*; 13) 'dry': *óṣati, εϋω*; 14) 'give': *dádāti, δίδωμι* 15) 'live': *jivati; ζάω, ζώω*; Rus. *zhit'*; Lith. *gýti, gyja* 'heal', 'recover', *gývas* 'alive'; 16) 'be': *ásti, εἰμί*; the primordial affiliation of the verb 'to be' to the group of active verbs is currently questioned and, apparently, it originally had a medial inflection.

Contrary to the author of this classification Mr Delbrück, as well as Mr Benveniste, for this semantically diverse group made some semantic generalization: here we have verbs with the meaning of movements and basic life manifestations of "active entities". Especially, this generalization fully corresponds to our typology of sentences.

Mr Benveniste, as you know, proposed another generalization: "In Active Voice, the verbs mean the process that emanates from the subject and develops outward. In Middle Voice, which is diathesis, defined through opposition from the first, the verb indicates the process that develops in the subject; the subject is internal to the process". It is unlikely that this generalization can be described as semantic one. Compare also that doubt expressed by Mr Perelmuter: "It is impossible, however, to exclude completely the possibility that the relationship we formulate has merely a syntactic character; that the phrase "action within the subject" is in this case a purely verbal transposition into the semantic area of a syntactic phenomenon of intrasitivity. But, whatever this generalization of Mr Benveniste was – syntactic, semantic or semiological – it is difficult to agree with it: if you can still imagine the processes of "blow", "flow", "spit out", etc., as "proceeding out of the subject", then the attributing this feature to "go", "eat", "drink", etc., is impossible do done.

Mr Stepanov agrees with Mr Benveniste in the sense that all these verbs can be transformed into transitional, object verbs. But for this generalization, the well-known term "transitivity" is more appropriate. However, another feature of *activa tantum* was noted by Mr Benveniste successfully: "In IE languages, "to be", as well as "to go" and "to flow", is a process in which the subject is not necessary". Indeed, the actions mentioned in the *activa tantum* group are permanent, generic characteristics of active entities, independent of their willpower: to be what they are,

they must ‘live’, ‘walk’ (or ‘crawl’), ‘flow’, ‘blow’, ‘burn’, etc. The “wind” is that which “blows”, the “water” is that which “flows”.

Another characteristic of this type of sentences is the distinction between truly active entities and non-trully active entities. To a certain extent, this semantic-syntactic distinction corresponds to the morphological difference between the two types of subject’s names, discovered by Mr Benveniste. While the names on *-*tor* denote the doer in the true sense of the word, the doer-maker, the “author”, the names on *-*ter* denote the doer-performer, “agent”, “tool”. It follows, further, that the names of active entities of the type “fire” as an active principle are opposed to inactive fire.

2.7.3. Sentences with Active Subject + Active Verb + Inactive Object

For this type of sentences, Mr Stepanov reconstructs two sources with the same probability, which may have acted simultaneously (just as two independent etymones are often found in the etymology of one word).

The first path is from the Ist (inactive) type of sentences. It is being reconstructed (in a different context of reconstruction) by Mr Gamkrelidze and Mr Ivanov as follows. If the PIE language at the most ancient stage was the language of the active system, then a sentence like “A person puts a stone” should have specific features in it. Since here the actant-subject is active and the actant-object is inactive, the structure of the predicate – in the typological correspondence with the structure of sentences of this type in active languages – should contain an indicator of an inactive actant, an object. This indicator, according to the reconstruction of Mr Gamkrelidze and Mr Ivanov is the element -*e*, the same one that acts as an indicator of the predicate (both the predicate-verb and the predicate-name) in the type of the sentence “The stone lies” (in our classification, in type I). Later this indicator became a flexion of the 3rd p. sg. of Medio-Perfect and entered into a number of inflections of the Perfect. Thus, from the point of view of this reconstruction, it should turn out that the sentence of the type “A person puts a stone” develops from the type “A person a stone lies”, and this last one of the type “Stone is lying” – through the introduction of an aquanthus-subject. This path can be called the development “from within a sentence”.

There are, however, grounds for suggesting a second way for the emergence of the type III sentences “A man puts a stone”, – “from outside a sentence”, that is, from a combination of two simple sentences in the text into one complex: “A man puts” (I active type sentence) + “The stone is lying” (II inactive type sentence) – “A man puts a stone” (III type sentence). We will call this way “serial” due to its typological similarity with the well-known language constructions of Southeast Asia languages. So, for example, in Vietnamese: “break the cup”: beat + break, be broken + cup (dánh + vo + chén); in the Akan language: “pour grains into water”: carry + pour + grain + swim (ke + fe + kwe + ok), i.e. “I pour grain” = “I pour + grain floats”.

Regarding the very term “serial construction”, it should be noted that many researchers apply it restrictively: only to single-subject series in African languages,

such as “I carry” + “I pour”; but there is no reason for such a restriction. IE analytical causatives of the French *laisser tomber* are of this type too “drop” = “allow” + “fall”.

Immediate traces of this path of development are observed in type IV of IE sentence. The presence of such a path forces us to assume the Baltic diathesis of the verb of the most archaic type, i.e. the development of paired verbs from the same root with ablaut alternations. Compare the above example: *Bemas merkia* (a verb of active or active-causative diathesis) + *Linai mirksta* (a verb of intransitive, inactive, medial diathesis) – *Bérnas merkia linùs*.

In this case, the development of an inactive actant-object initially had to adjoin the verb-predicate of the active sentence. This path (as well as the indicated “first” path from the reconstruction by Mr Gamkrelidze and Mr Ivanov) also finds typological parallels in the languages of the active system. In these languages, in such sentences as “The dog has bitten a snake”, the subject will be the name corresponding to the personal affix of the active class in the verb-predicate, i.e. “dog”; on the contrary, the name of the nearest object, i.e. “snake”, is incorporated without an indicator into the predicate. This type of sentence corresponds to the “second” path of IE sentence development. But in the same languages of active type the sentences of the same nature can be made differently: the closest object, here ‘the snake’, corresponds to the inactive affix of the verb-predicate in the word form of the active verb. The latter type of sentence corresponds to the “first” path of the IE sentence.

All these observations, in particular the “second” path, allows us to take two-diathesis verbs with the diathesis active-media verb as the historically primary type of predicates in the sentences of the type III (“A person puts a stone”).

2.7.4. Sentences with Active Subject + Verb + Active Object

The semantic (non-grammatical and non-lexical) example of this PIE type of sentence is – how it defines Mr Stepanov – “Man, the warrior, kills the enemy”. But it puts the researcher in front of many difficulties. At first glance, it may seem that the reason for these is that the designations of active entities, such as “man”, “enemy”, etc., as objects in the sentence, are either out of linguistic phenomena covered by the reconstruction of Mr Uhlenbeck, or their distribution within its framework is unclear. Indeed, for example, the stems on *-o* often belong to the names of the inactive class, cf. **pedo-* ‘footprint’ with the name of the active class **ped-* ‘foot’. However, on the other hand, the names of the animals of the active class of the type ‘wolf’ are also of the primordial stem on **-o*. The position of the stems on **-a, *-e* (particularly in Balto-Slavic), etc., is also insufficiently covered in this respect. The composition of the active class of names, its subclasses, segmentation, etc., as already mentioned above, has not yet been sufficiently studied.

Nevertheless, during the reconstruction of the sentence, these difficulties could be circumvented, since for reconstruction it was enough, as already shown, to have “minimalized” lexical entries. In this case, one would deal with lexemes that obviously belong to the stems on **-o*, for example, the “wolf”, or to the class of

objects that a person is able to actively influence, for example, “kill”. Then the existence of a sentence of type IV (limited in this sense) should not be in doubt.

In the written IE languages, the name in the object position is formed by the accusative form (form on *-*m*), regardless of whether the name belongs to the active or inactive class – in all stems on *-*o,* *-*ā,* *-*ē*, partially in stems on sonant and consonant of the type **ped*-, as well as in suffix stems on *-*ter*//*-*tor*//*-*tṛ*, etc. Meanwhile, in the reconstruction of Mr Uhlenbeck, the indicator *-*m* can be attributed only to the agent, i.e. to an inactive name in the position of the subject (in sentences of type I) and the object (in sentences of type III). As for the active name in the object’s position, it would have to acquire the form of an agent, but the latter, as already mentioned, is a form of inactive names.

The question arises: “In what form could the actant “------ the enemy” (active name in the position of the object) exist at this stage?” The answer to this question remains unclear. Mr Gamkrelidze and Mr Ivanov introduce a special concept “structural and syntactic inactivation”, in contrast to “primary, lexically defined inactivities with permanent markers of inactivity”. “Structural and syntactic inactivation” is a (supposed) form in which the name of a lexical active class (for example, “man”, “beast”), permanently marked with an activity indicator, could appear in a sentence in the position of an inactive actant – object, agent. Such a syntactic form cannot be its own form of this name, which prohibits its appearance in the position of an agent. This form cannot be a form of the case on *-*m*, since the latter is formed in the framework of the nominative-accusative structure of the language. What could be such a form?

Mr Stepanov sees only one, very distant parallel to the desired form – the Hittite names on -*ant*-. They are derived from the names of the neutrum (similar to the inactive class), which cannot appear in the subject’s position by the transitional verb, i.e. in sentences like “Water destroyed the house”. However, the derivative names on -*ant*- are not subject to this prohibition and may appear in this position, i.e. become “structurally syntactic entities” (for example, *u̯etenant*- “water” active while *u̯atar*-//*u̯eten*- “water” is inactive). However, in reality, we do not find any IE forms that could be directly associated with such actants as “------- the enemy” in type IV. Thus, paradoxically, it turns out that the type IV of sentence “Man, the warrior, kills the enemy” could not exist at the “Uhlenbeckian stage” and obviously could not exist at the earlier stages of the PIE language despite their reconstruction in the work of Mr Gamkrelidze and Mr Ivanov.

The conclusion is that the transformation of the language of the active system where there are no type IV of the sentences like “The warrior kills the enemy” with the morphological design of the active object and the corresponding predicate verb, into the language of the nominative-accusative system, where such sentences are typical, was associated with certain difficulties.

2.7.5. Sentences with Inactive Subject + Verb + Inactive Object

Mr Stepanov considers this type of sentence only related to the question of special occurrences of names like “water”, “fire”, “wind”, etc. If, as is reasonably assumed, PIE was the language of an active system, then there existed a binary separation of names into “active” and “inactive”. This simple and clear correlation is entirely attributed to such names as ‘water’, ‘fire’ and some others. It is supposed that there were at least two names for each of these entities – one designated it as an active life force, in particular a deity: roots **ṇgni-* ‘fire’ and **āp-* ‘water’; another – as an inactive thing: roots **wed-//*ud-* ‘water’, etc. This assumption goes back to the idea of Mr Meillet about the double EI names of ‘fire’ and ‘water’, expressed out of connection with the concept of active order, but in connection with his theory of IE grammatical gender. Mr Meillet counted the names of masculine gender primordially belonging to the “active” gender, and the names of neuter belonging to the “inactive” gender. Mr Schulze showed, however, that the gender relations in the names of water and fire underwent numerous reorganizations without any relation to “activity-inactivity”, so that the gender indicators in solving our question cannot play significant roles.

Let us return to the original position on the active structure of the PIE language. Here, however, many problems arise. If the overwhelming majority of names are classified in every language of active order into two named groups, then the concepts of water, fire and under are two different concepts and different semantemes, united only in the representation of a modern linguistics. Or is there before us some special phenomenon that falls out of the system of the active-order language, since in this case there is some generalizing concept, like a “hyper-lexeme”, represented by two sharply different words and concepts – one in the active and the other in the inactive class?

Our hypothesis is as follows. Words like *water, fire* and similar, like all the names of things, belonged originally to the inactive class, and their duplicity is a more recent phenomenon caused by various reinterpretations from the point of view of language, perhaps that names like *water, fire* are associated with predicates and probably even extracted from different predicates – the “active” name from the “active” predicate, the “inactive” name – from the “inactive” predicate.

The initial observation is that in all IE languages the elements and the names of “human elements” – *dream, work, service, war*, etc. – are included in tautological phrases based on the principle of figurative etymology or paronomasia. Some of these names are “eliminated” and “recoverable” subjects of impersonal sentences, the others are the same objects (Lat. *pugnam pugnare*), the third are objects but with a neutralized form of the subject-object, i.e. “nominative” = “accusative”, like Rus. *rabota rabotat’* instead *rabotu rabotat’*.

The material presented here suggests the existence of special verb-nominal tautological syntagm combinations in the PIE language, with an unfamiliar form of the object or subject. The semantics of such combinations probably reduced to the designation of elements, such as “(Grom) gremit”. It can also be assumed that these

phrases were distributed in the language into two classes. In one class (II active type of sentences), the name took the position of a subject or instrumental actant with the same verb – “Veter veyet”. In another class (III type of sentences), the name occupied the position of the nearest object also with the verb of the same root, in other words, syntagmas like “voevat’ vojnu” with effective transitivity and “analytical” direct object. It can also be assumed that the names of “active” class were extracted from tautological combinations corresponding to the type II of sentences, while the names of “inactive” class are extracted from combinations of type III sentences like “Man makes fire”.

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